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Relative generalized matrix weights of matrix codes
for universal security on wire-tap networks
Umberto Martı´nez-Pen˜as, Student Member, IEEE, and Ryutaroh Matsumoto, Member, IEEE,
Abstract—Universal security over a network with linear net-
work coding has been intensively studied. However, previous
linear codes and code pairs used for this purpose were linear
over a larger field than that used on the network, which restricts
the possible packet lengths of optimal universal secure codes,
does not allow to apply known list-decodable rank-metric codes
and requires performing operations over a large field. In this
work, we introduce new parameters (relative generalized matrix
weights and relative dimension/rank support profile) for code
pairs that are linear over the field used in the network, and show
that they measure the universal security performance of these
code pairs. For one code and non-square matrices, generalized
matrix weights coincide with the existing Delsarte generalized
weights, hence we prove the connection between these latter
weights and secure network coding, which was left open. As
main applications, the proposed new parameters enable us to:
1) Obtain optimal universal secure linear codes on noiseless
networks for all possible packet lengths, in particular for packet
lengths not considered before, 2) Obtain the first universal secure
list-decodable rank-metric code pairs with polynomial-sized lists,
based on a recent construction by Guruswami et al, and 3)
Obtain new characterizations of security equivalences of linear
codes. Finally, we show that our parameters extend relative
generalized Hamming weights and relative dimension/length
profile, respectively, and relative generalized rank weights and
relative dimension/intersection profile, respectively.
Index Terms—Network coding, rank weight, relative dimen-
sion/rank support profile, relative generalized matrix weight,
universal secure network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
L INEAR network coding was first studied in [1], [23] and[25], and enables us to realize higher throughput than
the conventional storing and forwarding. Error correction in
this context was first studied in [5], and security, meaning
information leakage to an adversary wire-tapping links in
the network, was first considered in [6]. In that work, the
authors give outer codes with optimal information rate for the
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given security performance, although using large fields on the
network. The field size was later reduced in [15] by reducing
the information rate. In addition, the approach in [14] allows
us to see secure network coding as a generalization of secret
sharing [4], [37], which is a generalization of the wire-tap
channel of type II [33].
However, these approaches [6], [14], [15] require know-
ing and/or modifying the underlying linear network code,
which does not allow us to perform, for instance, random
linear network coding [21], which achieves capacity in a
decentralized manner and is robust to network changes. Later,
the use of pairs of linear (block) codes as outer codes was
proposed in [39] to protect messages from errors together with
information leakage to a wire-tapping adversary (see Remark
4), depending only on the number of errors and wire-tapped
links, respectively, and not depending on the underlying linear
network code, which is referred to as universal security in [39].
In [39], the encoded message consists of n (number of
outgoing links from the source) vectors in Fqm or Fmq , called
packets, where m is called the packet length and where Fq
is the field used for the underlying linear network code, as
opposed to previous works [6], [14], [15], where m = 1. The
universal performance of the proposed linear codes in [39] is
measured by the rank metric [9], and the authors in [39] prove
that linear codes in Fnqm with optimal rank-metric parameters
when n ≤ m [17], [36] are also optimal for universal security.
This approach was already proposed in [38], [40] for error
correction, again not depending on the underlying network
code. Later the authors in [20] obtained the first list-decodable
rank-metric codes whose list sizes are polynomial in the
code length and which are able to list-decode universally
on linearly coded networks roughly twice as many errors as
optimal rank-metric codes [17], [36] can correct. The rank
metric was then generalized in [24] to relative generalized rank
weights (RGRWs) and relative dimension/intersection profiles
(RDIPs), which were proven in [24] to measure exactly and
simultaneously the universal security performance and error-
correction capability of pairs of linear codes, in the same
way as relative generalized Hamming weights (RGHWs) and
relative dimension/length profiles (RDLPs) [26], [42] do on
wire-tap channels of type II.
Unfortunately, the codes studied and proposed in [24], [38],
[39], [40] for universal security are linear over the extension
field Fqm . This restricts the possible packet lengths of optimal
universal secure codes, requires performing computations over
the larger field Fqm and leaves out important codes, such as
the list-decodable rank-metric codes in [20], which are only
linear over Fq.
2In this work, we introduce new parameters, called relative
generalized matrix weights (RGMWs) and relative dimen-
sion/rank support profiles (RDRPs), for codes and code pairs
that are linear over the smaller field Fq , and prove that
they measure their universal security performance in terms
of the worst-case information leakage. As main applications,
we obtain the first optimal universal secure linear codes on
noiseless networks for all possible packet lengths, we obtain
the first universal secure list-decodable rank-metric code pairs
with polynomial-sized lists, and obtain new characterizations
of security equivalences of linear codes.
A. Notation
Let q be a prime power and m and n, two positive integers.
We denote by Fq the finite field with q elements, which we
will consider to be the field used for the underlying linear
network code (see [23, Definition 1]).
Most of our technical results hold for an arbitrary field,
which we denote by F and which mathematically plays the
role of Fq . Fn denotes the vector space of row vectors of
length n with components in F, and Fm×n denotes the vector
space of m × n matrices with components in F. Throughout
the paper, a (block) code in Fm×n (respectively, in Fn) is a
subset of Fm×n (respectively, of Fn), and it is called linear if
it is a vector space over F. In all cases, dimensions of vector
spaces over F will be denoted by dim.
Finally, we recall that we may identify Fnqm and F
m×n
q as
vector spaces over Fq. Fix a basis α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm as
a vector space over Fq. We define the matrix representation
map Mα : Fnqm −→ F
m×n
q associated to the previous basis by
Mα(c) = (ci,j)1≤i≤m,1≤j≤n, (1)
where ci = (ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,n) ∈ Fnq , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
are the unique vectors in Fnq such that c =
∑m
i=1 αici. The
map Mα : Fnqm −→ F
m×n
q is an Fq-linear vector space
isomorphism.
The works [24], [38], [39], [40] consider Fqm-linear codes
in Fnqm , which are a subfamily of Fq-linear codes in F
m×n
q
through the map given in (1). In this paper, we will consider
arbitrary linear (meaning F-linear) codes in Fm×n.
B. Our motivations
Our main motivation to study universal secure network
coding is to avoid knowing and/or modifying the underlying
linear network code, and in particular be able to apply our
theory on random linearly coded networks [21], which achieve
capacity in a decentralized manner and are robust to network
changes.
Our main motivation to study pairs of linear codes is to be
able to protect messages simultaneously from errors, erasures
and information leakage to a wire-tapper. See also Section II
and more concretely, Remark 4.
Our main motivations to study codes which are linear over
the base field Fq instead of the extension field Fqm are the
following:
1) Fq-linear codes with optimal rank-metric parameters [9],
and thus with optimal universal security and error-correction
capability, cannot be Fqm -linear for most packet lengths m
when m < n. In many applications, packet lengths satisfying
m < n are required (see the discussion in [24, Subsection
I-A], for instance).
2) The only known list-decodable rank-metric codes [20]
with polynomial-sized lists are linear over Fq, but not over
Fqm . Hence the previous studies on universal security cannot
be applied on these codes. In particular, no construction of
universal secure list-decodable rank-metric coding schemes
with polynomial-sized lists are known.
3) In previous works [38], [39], [40], the proposed codes
are Fqm -linear and m ≥ n. In many cases, this requires
performing operations over a very large field, instead of the
much smaller field Fq .
C. Related works and considered open problems
We consider the following four open problems in the
literature, which correspond to the main four contributions
listed in the following subsection:
1) Several parameters have been introduced to measure the
security performance of linear codes and code pairs on differ-
ent channels, in terms of the worst-case information leakage.
The original RGHWs and RDLPs [26], [42] measure security
performance over wire-tap channels of type II, and relative
network generalized Hamming weigths (RNGHWs) [31], [45]
measure security performance over networks depending on
the underlying linear network code (non-universal security).
Later, RGRWs and RDIPs were introduced in [24], [32] to
measure universal security performance of Fqm-linear code
pairs C2 & C1 ⊆ Fnqm . A notion of generalized weight for one
Fq-linear code (that is, for an arbitrary C1 and for C2 = {0})
in Fm×nq , called Delsarte generalized weights (DGWs), was
introduced in [34], but its connection with universal security
was only given for Fqm-linear codes. Thus, no measure of
universal security performance for all Fq-linear codes or code
pairs is known. See also Table I.
2) The first optimal universal secure linear codes for
noiseless networks were obtained in [39, Section V], whose
information rate attain the information-theoretical limit given
in [6]. However, these codes only exist when m ≥ n. The
cartesian products in [39, Subsection VII-C] are also optimal
among Fq-linear codes (see Remark 22), but only exist when
m divides n. No optimal universal secure Fq-linear codes for
noiseless networks have been obtained for the rest of values
of m. See also Table II for an overview of existing optimal
constructions, including non-universal codes [6], [14], [15].
3) In [20], the authors introduce the first list-decodable
rank-metric codes in Fnqm able to list-decode close to the
information-theoretical limit and roughly twice as many errors
as optimal rank-metric codes [17], [36] are able to correct,
in polynomial time and with polynomial-sized lists (on the
length n). However, no universal secure coding schemes with
such list-decoding capabilities are known. Observe that list-
decoding rank errors implies list-decoding errors in linear
network coding in a universal manner [38].
4) Several characterizations of maps between vector spaces
of matrices preserving certain properties have been given in
3TABLE I
NEW AND EXISTING NOTIONS OF GENERALIZED WEIGHTS
Work Paremeters Codes they are used on Measured security
Definitions 10 & 11, & Theorem 1 RGMW & RDRP C2 & C1 ⊆ F
m×n
q , Fq-linear Universal security on networks
[24], [32] RGRW & RDIP C2 & C1 ⊆ Fnqm , Fqm -linear Universal security on networks
[34] DGW C2 = {0} & C1 ⊆ F
m×n
q , Fq-linear Universal security on networks for Fqm -linear
[26], [42] RGHW & RDLP C2 & C1 ⊆ Fnq , Fq-linear Security on wire-tap channels II
[31], [45] RNGHW C2 & C1 ⊆ Fnq , Fq-linear Non-universal security on networks
TABLE II
NEW AND EXISTING OPTIMAL SECURE CODES FOR NOISELESS NETWORKS (N = # LINKS, µ = # OBSERVATIONS, t = # DESTINATIONS)
Work Universality Field size (q) used over the network Packet length (m)
Theorem 2 Yes Any Any
[39] Yes Any m ≥ n or n = lm
[6] No q >
(N
µ
)
–
[15] No q = Θ(Nµ/2) –
[14] No q >
(N−1
µ−1
)
+ t or q >
(
2n3t2−1
µ−1
)
+ t –
TABLE III
NEW AND EXISTING CHARACTERIZATIONS OF LINEAR ISOMORPHISMS BETWEEN VECTOR SPACES OF MATRICES PRESERVING CERTAIN PROPERTIES
Work Domain & codomain Linearity Properties preserved
Theorem 4 φ : V −→W , V ∈ RS(Fm×n), W ∈ RS(Fm×n
′
) F-linear Universal security on networks
[28] φ : V −→W , V ∈ RS(Fm×nq ), W ∈ RS(F
m×n′
q ) Fqm -linear Ranks & universal security on networks
[3] φ : Fnqm −→ F
n
qm Fqm -linear Ranks
[27], [30] φ : Fm×n −→ Fm×n F-linear Ranks, determinants & eigenvalues
[10] φ : Fn×n −→ Fn×n F-linear Invertible matrices
the literature [3], [10], [27], [28], [30]. The maps considered
in [3] are linear over the extension field Fqm and preserve
ranks, and the maps considered in [10], [27], [30] are linear
over the base field (Fq or an arbitrary field) and preserve fun-
damental properties of matrices, such as ranks, determinants,
eigenvalues or invertible matrices. Characterizations of maps
preserving universal security performance were first given in
[28], although the considered maps were only linear over Fqm .
No characterizations of general Fq-linear maps preserving
universal security are known. See also Table III.
D. Our contributions and main results
In the following, we list our four main contributions to-
gether with our main result summarizing each of them. Each
contribution tackles each open problem listed in the previous
subsection, respectively.
1) We introduce new parameters, RGMWs and RDRPs,
in Definitions 10 and 11, respectively, which measure the
universal security performance of Fq-linear code pairs C2 &
C1 ⊆ Fm×nq , in terms of the worst-case information leakage.
The main result is Theorem 1 and states the following: The
r-th RGMW of the code pair is the minimum number of links
that an adversary needs to wire-tap in order to obtain at least
r bits of information (multiplied by log2(q)) about the sent
message. The µ-th RDRP of the code pair is the maximum
number of bits of information (multiplied by log2(q)) about
the sent message that can be obtained by wire-tapping µ links
of the network.
Since Fqm -linear codes in Fnqm are also Fq-linear codes in
Fm×nq , RGMWs and RDRPs must coincide with RGRWs and
RDIPs [24], respectively, for Fqm-linear codes in Fnqm , which
we prove in Theorem 7.
When C2 = {0} and m 6= n, we will also show in Theorem
9 that the RGMWs of the pair coincide with their DGWs,
given in [34], hence proving the connection between DGWs
and universal security for general Fq-linear codes, which was
left open.
2) We obtain optimal universal secure Fq-linear codes for
noiseless networks for any value of m and n, not only when
m ≥ n or m divides n, as in previous works [39]. The main
result is Theorem 2, which states the following: Denote by ℓ
the number of packets in Fmq that the source can transmit and
by t the number of links the adversary may wire-tap without
obtaining any information about the sent packets. For any m
and n, and a fixed value of ℓ (respectively t), we obtain a
coding scheme with optimal value of t (respectively ℓ).
3) We obtain the first universal secure list-decodable rank-
metric code pairs with polynomial-sized lists. The main result
is Theorem 3, and states the following: Defining ℓ and t as
in the previous item, assuming that n divides m, and fixing
1 ≤ k2 < k2 ≤ n, ε > 0 and a positive integer s such that
4sn ≤ εm and m/n = O(s/ε), we obtain an Fq-linear code
pair such that ℓ ≥ m(k1 − k2)(1 − 2ε), t ≥ k2 and which
can list-decode ss+1 (n − k1) rank errors in polynomial time,
where the list size is qO(s
2/ε2).
4) We obtain characterizations of vector space isomorphisms
between certain spaces of matrices over Fq that preserve
universal security performance over networks. The main result
is Theorem 4, which gives several characterizations of Fq-
linear vector space isomorphisms φ : V −→ W , where V and
4W are rank support spaces in Fm×nq and F
m×n′
q (see Definition
7), respectively.
As application, we obtain in Subsection VI-B ranges of
possible parameters m and n that given linear codes and
code pairs can be applied to without changing their universal
security performance.
E. Organization of the paper
First, all of our main results are stated as Theorems. After
some preliminaries in Section II, we introduce in Section
III the new parameters of linear code pairs (RGMWs and
RDRPs), give their connection with the rank metric, and prove
that they exactly measure the worst-case information leakage
universally on networks (Theorem 1). In Section IV, we give
optimal universal secure linear codes for noiseless networks
for all possible parameters (Theorem 2). In Section V, we
show how to add universal security to the list-decodable rank-
metric codes in [20] (Theorem 3). In Section VI, we define and
give characterizations of security equivalences of linear codes
(Theorem 4), and then obtain ranges of possible parameters
of linear codes up to these equivalences. In Section VII, we
give upper and lower Singleton-type bounds (Theorems 5 and
6) and study when they can be attained, when the dimensions
are divisible by m. Finally, in Section VIII, we prove that
RGMWs extend RGRWs [24] and RGHWs [26], [42], and we
prove that RDRPs extend RDIPs [24] and RDLPs [16], [26]
(Theorems 7 and 8, respectively). We conclude the section by
showing that GMWs coincide with DGWs [34] for non-square
matrices, and are strictly larger otherwise (Theorem 9).
II. COSET CODING SCHEMES FOR UNIVERSAL SECURITY
IN LINEAR NETWORK CODING
This section serves as a brief summary of the model of linear
network coding that we consider (Subsection II-A), the con-
cept of universal security under this model (Subsection II-B)
and the main definitions concerning coset coding schemes used
for this purpose (Subsection II-C). The section only contains
definitions and facts known in the literature, which will be
used throughout the paper.
A. Linear network coding model
Consider a network with several sources and several sinks.
A given source transmits a message x ∈ Fℓq through the
network to multiple sinks. To that end, that source encodes
the message as a collection of n packets of length m, seen as
a matrix C ∈ Fm×nq , where n is the number of outgoing links
from this source. We consider linear network coding on the
network, first considered in [1], [25] and formally defined in
[23, Definition 1], which allows us to reach higher throughput
than just storing and forwarding on the network. This means
that a given sink receives a matrix of the form
Y = CAT ∈ Fm×Nq ,
whereA ∈ FN×nq is called the transfer matrix corresponding to
the considered source and sink, and AT denotes its transpose.
This matrix may be randomly chosen if random linear network
coding is applied [21].
B. Universal secure communication over networks
In secure and reliable network coding, two of the main
problems addressed in the literature are the following:
1) Error and erasure correction [5], [24], [38], [39], [40]:
An adversary and/or a noisy channel may introduce
errors on some links of the network and/or modify the
transfer matrix. In this case, the sink receives the matrix
Y = CA′T + E ∈ Fm×Nq ,
where A′ ∈ FN×nq is the modified transfer matrix, and
E ∈ Fm×Nq is the final error matrix. In this case, we
say that t = Rk(E) errors and ρ = n−Rk(A′) erasures
occurred, where Rk denotes the rank of a matrix.
2) Information leakage [6], [14], [15], [24], [39]: A wire-
tapping adversary listens to µ > 0 links of the network,
obtaining a matrix of the form CBT ∈ Fm×µq , for some
matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq .
Outer coding in the source node is usually applied to tackle
the previous problems, and it is called universal secure [39] if
it provides reliability and security as in the previous items for
fixed numbers of wire-tapped links µ, errors t and erasures ρ,
independently of the transfer matrix A used. This implies that
no previous knowledge or modification of the transfer matrix
is required and random linear network coding [21] may be
applied.
C. Coset coding schemes for outer codes
Coding techniques for protecting messages simultaneously
from errors and information leakage to a wire-tapping adver-
sary were first studied by Wyner in [43]. In [43, p. 1374],
the general concept of coset coding scheme, as we will next
define, was first introduced for this purpose. We use the formal
definition in [24, Definition 7]:
Definition 1 (Coset coding schemes [24], [43]). A coset
coding scheme over the field F with message set S is a family
of disjoint nonempty subsets of Fm×n, PS = {Cx}x∈S .
If F = Fq , each x ∈ S is encoded by the source by choosing
uniformly at random an element C ∈ Cx.
Definition 2 (Linear coset coding schemes [28, Definition
2]). A coset coding scheme as in the previous definition is
said to be linear if S = Fℓ, for some 0 < ℓ ≤ mn, and
aCx + bCy ⊆ Cax+by,
for all a, b ∈ F and all x,y ∈ Fℓ.
With these definitions, the concept of coset coding scheme
generalizes the concept of (block) code, since a code is a
coset coding scheme where |Cx| = 1, for each x ∈ S. In
the same way, linear coset coding schemes generalize linear
(block) codes.
An equivalent way to describe linear coset coding schemes
is by nested linear code pairs, introduced in [44, Section III.A].
We use the description in [7, Subsection 4.2].
Definition 3 (Nested linear code pairs [7], [44]). A nested
linear code pair is a pair of linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n.
5Choose a vector space W such that C1 = C2 ⊕W , where ⊕
denotes the direct sum of vector spaces, and a vector space
isomorphism ψ : Fℓ −→ W , where ℓ = dim(C1/C2). Then
we define Cx = ψ(x) + C2, for x ∈ Fℓ. They form a linear
coset coding scheme called nested coset coding scheme [24].
Remark 4. As observed in [33] for the wire-tap channel of
type II, linear code pairs where C1 = Fm×n are suitable
for protecting information from leakage on noiseless channels.
Analogously, linear code pairs where C2 = {0} are suitable
for error correction without the presence of eavesdroppers.
Observe that these two types of linear code pairs are dual to
each other (see Definition 15 and Appendix A): If C′1 = C
⊥
2
and C′2 = C
⊥
1 , then C1 = F
m×n if, and only if, C′2 = {0}. To
treat both error correction and information leakage, we need
general linear coset coding schemes.
We recall here that the concept of linear coset coding
schemes and nested coset coding schemes are exactly the
same. An object in the first family uniquely defines an object
in the second family and vice-versa. This is formally proven
in [28, Proposition 1].
Finally, we recall that the exact universal error and erasure
correction capability of a nested coset coding scheme was
found, in terms of the rank metric, first in [38, Section IV.C]
for the case of one code (C2 = {0}) that is maximum rank
distance, then in [39, Theorem 2] for the general case of one
linear code (again C2 = {0}), then in [24, Theorem 4] for
the case where both codes are linear over an extension field
Fqm , and finally in [28, Theorem 9] for arbitrary coset coding
schemes (linear over Fq and non-linear).
III. NEW PARAMETERS OF LINEAR COSET CODING
SCHEMES FOR UNIVERSAL SECURITY ON NETWORKS
This is the main section of the paper, which serves as a
basis for the rest of sections. The next sections can be read
independently of each other, but all of them build on the
results in this section. Here we introduce rank support spaces
(Subsection III-A), which are the main technical building
blocks of our theory, then we define of our main parameters
and connect them with the rank metric (Subsection III-B), and
we conclude by showing (Theorem 1) that these parameters
measure the worst-case information leakage universally on
linearly coded networks (Subsection III-C).
A. Rank supports and rank support spaces
In this subsection, we introduce rank support spaces, which
are the mathematical building blocks of our theory. The idea
is to attach to each linear code its rank support, given in [22,
Definition 1], and based on this rank support, define a vector
space of matrices containing the original code that can be seen
as its ambient space with respect to the rank metric.
We remark here that the family of rank support spaces can
be seen as the family of vector spaces in [35, Notation 25]
after transposition of matrices, or the family of vector spaces
in [22, Definition 6] taking C = Fm×nq . We start with the
definitions:
Definition 5 (Row space and rank). For a matrix C ∈ Fm×n,
we define its row space Row(C) as the vector space in Fn
generated by its rows. As usual, we define its rank as Rk(C) =
dim(Row(C)).
Definition 6 (Rank support and rank weight [22, Definition
1]). Given a vector space C ⊆ Fm×n, we define its rank
support as
RSupp(C) =
∑
C∈C
Row(C) ⊆ Fn.
We also define the rank weight of the space C as
wtR(C) = dim(RSupp(C)).
Observe that RSupp(〈{C}〉) = Row(C) and wtR(〈{C}〉)
= Rk(C), for every matrix C ∈ Fm×n, where 〈A〉 denotes
the vector space generated by a set A over F.
Definition 7 (Rank support spaces). Given a vector space
L ⊆ Fn, we define its rank support space VL ⊆ Fm×n as
VL = {V ∈ Fm×n | Row(V ) ⊆ L}.
We denote by RS(Fm×n) the family of rank support spaces
in Fm×n.
The following lemma shows that rank support spaces behave
as a sort of ambient spaces for linear codes and can be attached
bijectively to vector spaces in Fn, which correspond to the
rank supports of the original linear codes.
Lemma 8. Let L ⊆ Fn be a vector space. The following hold:
1) VL is a vector space and the correspondence L 7→ VL
between subspaces of Fn and rank support spaces is a
bijection with inverse VL 7→ RSupp(VL) = L.
2) If C ⊆ Fm×n is a vector space and L = RSupp(C),
then VL is the smallest rank support space containing
C.
We conclude the subsection with the following characteri-
zations of rank support spaces, which we will use throughout
the paper. In particular, item 2 will be useful to prove Theorem
4, and item 3 will be useful to prove Theorem 1.
Proposition 9. Fix a set V ⊆ Fm×n. The following are
equivalent:
1) V is a rank support space. That is, there exists a
subspace L ⊆ Fn such that V = VL.
2) V is linear and has a basis of the form Bi,j , for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , k, where there are vectors
b1,b2, . . . ,bk ∈ Fn such that Bi,j has the vector bj in
the i-th row and the rest of its rows are zero vectors.
3) There exists a matrix B ∈ Fµ×n, for some positive
integer µ, such that
V = {V ∈ Fm×n | V BT = 0}.
In addition, the relation between items 1, 2 and 3 is that
b1,b2, . . . ,bk are a basis of L, B is a (possibly not full-
rank) parity check matrix of L and dim(L) = n− Rk(B).
In particular, it holds that
dim(VL) = m dim(L). (2)
6Proof. We prove the following implications:
• 1 ⇐⇒ 2: Assume item 1, let b1,b2, . . . ,bk be a basis
of L, and let Bi,j be as in item 2. Then we see that
V = 〈{Bi,j | 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ k}〉. The reversed
implication follows in the same way by defining L =
〈b1,b2, . . . ,bk〉 ⊆ Fn.
• 1 ⇐⇒ 3: Assume item 1 and let B ∈ Fµ×n be a parity
check matrix of L. That is, a generator matrix of the
dual L⊥ ⊆ Fn. Then it holds by definition that V ∈
Fm×n has all its rows in L if, and only if, V BT = 0.
Conversely, assuming item 3 and defining L as the code
with parity check matrix B, we see that V = VL by the
same argument. Hence the result follows.
B. Definition and basic properties of the new parameters
Definition 10 (Relative Generalized Matrix Weight). Given
nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ =
dim(C1/C2), we define their r-th relative generalized matrix
weight (RGMW) as
dM,r(C1, C2) = min{dim(L) | L ⊆ Fn,
dim(C1 ∩ VL)− dim(C2 ∩ VL) ≥ r}.
For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n, and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we define
its r-th generalized matrix weight (GMW) as
dM,r(C) = dM,r(C, {0}). (3)
Observe that it holds that
dM,r(C1, C2) ≥ dM,r(C1), (4)
for all nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and all 1 ≤ r ≤
ℓ = dim(C1/C2).
Definition 11 (Relative Dimension/Rank support Profile).
Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n,
we define their µ-th relative dimension/rank support profile
(RDRP) as
KM,µ(C1, C2) = max{dim(C1 ∩ VL)− dim(C2 ∩ VL) |
L ⊆ Fn, dim(L) ≤ µ}.
Now, if U ⊆ V ⊆ Fm×n are vector spaces, the natural linear
map C1∩U/C2∩U −→ C1∩V/C2∩V is one to one. Therefore,
since we are taking maximums, it holds that
KM,µ(C1, C2) = max{dim(C1 ∩ VL)− dim(C2 ∩ VL) |
L ⊆ Fn, dim(L) = µ}.
We remark here that some existing notions of relative
generalized weights from the literature are particular cases of
RGMWs. The corresponding connections are given in Section
VIII. In particular, GMWs of one linear code coincide with
DGWs (introduced in [34]) for non-square matrices.
We next obtain the following characterization of RGMWs
that gives an analogous description to the original definition
of GHWs by Wei [42]:
Proposition 12. Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n,
and an integer 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2), it holds that
dM,r(C1, C2) = min{wtR(D) | D ⊆ C1,D ∩ C2 = {0},
dim(D) = r}.
Proof. Denote by dr the number on the left-hand side and
by d′r the number on the right-hand side. We prove both
inequalities:
dr ≤ d′r: Take a vector space D ⊆ C1 such that D ∩ C2 =
{0}, dim(D) = r and wtR(D) = d′r. Define L = RSupp(D).
Since D ⊆ VL, we have that dim((C1 ∩ VL)/(C2 ∩ VL)) ≥
dim((C1 ∩ D)/(C2 ∩ D)) = dim(D) = r. Hence
dr ≤ dim(L) = wtR(D) = d
′
r.
dr ≥ d′r: Take a vector space L ⊆ F
n such that dim((C1 ∩
VL)/(C2 ∩ VL)) ≥ r and dim(L) = dr.
There exists a vector space D ⊆ C1 ∩ VL with D ∩ C2 =
{0} and dim(D) = r. We have that RSupp(D) ⊆ L, since
D ⊆ VL, and hence
dr = dim(L) ≥ wtR(D) ≥ d
′
r.
Thanks to this characterization, we may connect RGMWs
with the rank distance [9]. This will be crucial in the next
section, where we will use maximum rank distance codes from
[9] to obtain optimal universal secure linear codes for noiseless
networks. Recall the definition of minimum rank distance of a
linear coset coding scheme, which is a particular case of [28,
Equation (1)], and which is based on the analogous concept
for the Hamming metric given in [13]:
dR(C1, C2) = min{Rk(C) | C ∈ C1, C /∈ C2}. (5)
The following result follows from the previous theorem and
the definitions:
Corollary 13 (Minimum rank distance of linear coset cod-
ing schemes). Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n,
it holds that
dR(C1, C2) = dM,1(C1, C2).
By Theorem 9, the previous corollary coincides with item
1 in [34, Theorem 30] when C2 = {0} and m 6= n.
We conclude by showing the connection between RDRPs
and RGMWs:
Proposition 14 (Connection between RDRPs and
RGMWs). Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and
1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2), it holds that
dM,r(C1, C2) = min{µ | KM,µ(C1, C2) ≥ r}.
Proof. It is proven as [24, Proof of Lemma 4].
7C. Measuring information leakage on networks
In this subsection, we show how the introduced parameters
(RGMWs and RDRPs) measure the universal security perfor-
mance of nested linear code pairs.
Assume that a given source wants to convey the message
x ∈ Fℓq, which we assume is a random variable with uniform
distribution over Fℓq. Following Subsection II-C, the source
encodes x into a matrix C ∈ Fm×nq using nested linear codes
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq . We also assume that the distributions used
in the encoding are all uniform (see Subsection II-C).
According to the information leakage model in Subsection
II-B, item 2, a wire-tapping adversary obtains CBT ∈ Fm×µq ,
for some matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq .
Recall from [8] the definition of mutual information of two
random variables X and Y :
I(X ;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y | X), (6)
where H(Y ) denotes the entropy of Y and H(Y | X) denotes
the conditional entropy of Y given X , and where we take
logarithms with base q (see [8] for more details).
We will need to use the concept of duality with respect
to the Hilbert-Schmidt or trace product. In Appendix A, we
collect some basic properties of duality of linear codes. We
now give the main definitions:
Definition 15 (Hilbert-Schmidt or trace product). Given
matrices C,D ∈ Fm×n, we define its Hilbert-Schmidt product,
or trace product, as
〈C,D〉 = Trace(CDT )
=
m∑
i=1
ci · di =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ci,jdi,j ∈ F,
where ci and di are the rows of C and D, respectively, and
where ci,j and di,j are their components, respectively.
Given a vector space C ⊆ Fm×n, we denote by C⊥ its dual:
C⊥ = {D ∈ Fm×n | 〈C,D〉 = 0, ∀C ∈ C}.
We first compute the mutual information of the message
and the wire-tapper’s observation via rank support spaces:
Proposition 16. Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq ,
a matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq , and the uniform random variables x and
CBT , as in the beginning of this subsection, it holds that
I(x;CBT ) = dim(C⊥2 ∩ VL)− dim(C
⊥
1 ∩ VL), (7)
where I(x;CBT ) is as in (6), and where L = Row(B).
Proof. Define the map f : Fm×nq −→ F
m×µ
q given by
f(D) = DBT ,
for the matrix B ∈ Fµ×nq . Observe that f is a linear map. It
follows that
H(CBT ) = H(f(C)) = logq(|f(C1)|) = dim(f(C1))
= dim(C1)− dim(ker(f) ∩ C1),
where the last equality is the well-known first isomorphism
theorem. On the other hand, we may similarly compute the
conditional entropy:
H(CBT | x) = H(f(C) | x) = logq(|f(C2)|) = dim(f(C2))
= dim(C2)− dim(ker(f) ∩ C2).
However, it holds that ker(f) = VL⊥ ⊆ Fm×nq by Proposition
9, since B is a parity check matrix of L⊥. Therefore
I(x;CBT ) = H(CBT )−H(CBT | x)
= (dim(C1)−dim(VL⊥ ∩C1))− (dim(C2)−dim(VL⊥ ∩C2)).
Finally, the result follows by Lemmas 63 and 64 in Appendix
A.
The following theorem follows from the previous proposi-
tion, Corollary 13 and the definitions:
Theorem 1 (Worst-case information leakage). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq , and integers 0 ≤ µ ≤ n and
1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2), it holds that
1) µ = dM,r(C
⊥
2 , C
⊥
1 ) is the minimum number of links that
an adversary needs to wire-tap in order to obtain at
least r units of information (number of bits multiplied
by log2(q)) of the sent message.
2) r = KM,µ(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 ) is the maximum information (num-
ber of bits multiplied by log2(q)) about the sent message
that can be obtained by wire-tapping at most µ links of
the network.
In particular, t = dR(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 )− 1 is the maximum number of
links that an adversary may listen to without obtaining any
information about the sent message.
Remark 17. Proposition 16 extends [24, Lemma 7, item 2]
from Fqm -linear codes in Fnqm to Fq-linear codes in F
m×n
q
due to Lemma 52 in Subsection VIII-A. Furthermore, as we
will explain in Theorem 7, our Theorem 1 extends in the same
sense [24, Theorem 2] and [24, Corollary 5].
Remark 18. In Section VIII, we will prove that GMWs
coincide with DGWs [34] when using one code (C⊥1 = {0}
in Theorem 1) and non-square matrices. Hence the results
in this subsection prove that DGWs measure the worst-case
information leakage in these cases, which has not been proven
in the literature yet.
IV. OPTIMAL UNIVERSAL SECURE LINEAR CODES FOR
NOISELESS NETWORKS AND ANY PACKET LENGTH
In this section, we obtain linear coset coding schemes built
from nested linear code pairs C $ Fm×n, which in this section
will refer to those with C2 = C and C1 = Fm×n, with optimal
universal security performance in the case of finite fields F =
Fq (Theorem 2). Recall from Subsection II-C that these linear
coset coding schemes are suitable for noiseless networks, as
noticed in [33] (see also Remark 4).
In this section, we consider perfect universal secrecy (the
adversary obtains no information after wire-tapping a given
8number of links), thus we make use of the theory in last section
concerning the first RGMW. In Section VII, we will consider
bounds on the rest of RGMWs, for general code pairs (suitable
for noisy networks), and their achievability.
Definition 19. For a nested linear code pair of the form
C $ Fm×nq , we define its information parameter as ℓ =
dim(Fm×nq /C) = dim(C
⊥), that is the maximum number of
log2(q) bits of information that the source can convey, and
its security parameter t as the maximum number of links that
an adversary may listen to without obtaining any information
about the sent message.
Due to Theorem 1, it holds that t = dR(C⊥)− 1. We study
two problems:
1) Find a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with maximum
possible security parameter t when m, n, q and the
information parameter ℓ are fixed and given.
2) Find a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with maximum
possible information parameter ℓ when m, n, q and the
security parameter t are fixed and given.
We will deduce bounds on these parameters from the
Singleton bound on the dimension of rank-metric codes [9,
Theorem 5.4]:
Lemma 20 ([9, Theorem 5.4]). For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×nq ,
it holds that
dim(C) ≤ max{m,n}(min{m,n} − dR(C) + 1). (8)
As usual in the literature, we say that C is maximum rank
distance (MRD) if equality holds in (8).
Thanks to Theorem 1 and the previous lemma, we may give
upper bounds on the attainable parameters in the previous two
problems:
Proposition 21. Given a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq
with information parameter ℓ and security parameter t, it
holds that:
ℓ ≤ max{m,n}(min{m,n} − t), (9)
t ≤ min{m,n} −
⌈
ℓ
max{m,n}
⌉
. (10)
In particular, ℓ ≤ mn and t ≤ min{m,n}.
Proof. Recall that ℓ = dim(Fm×nq /C) = dim(C
⊥) and, due
to Theorem 1, t = dR(C⊥)−1. Hence the result follows from
the bound (8) for C⊥.
On the other hand, the existence of linear codes in Fm×nq
attaining the Singleton bound on their dimensions, for all
possible choices of m, n and minimum rank distance dR
[9, Theorem 6.3], leads to the following existence result on
optimal linear coset coding schemes for noiseless networks.
Theorem 2. For all choices of positive integers m and n, and
all finite fields Fq , the following hold:
1) For every positive integer ℓ ≤ mn, there exists a
nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with information
parameter ℓ and security parameter t = min{m,n} −
⌈(ℓ/max{m,n})⌉.
2) For every positive integer t ≤ min{m,n}, there ex-
ists a nested linear code pair C $ Fm×nq with se-
curity parameter t and information parameter ℓ =
max{m,n}(min{m,n} − t).
Remark 22. We remark here that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, only the linear coset coding schemes in item 2 in the
previous theorem, for the special case n ≤ m, have been
obtained in the literature. It corresponds to [39, Theorem 7].
Using cartesian products of MRD codes as in [39, Sub-
section VII-C], linear coset coding schemes as in item 2 in
the previous theorem can be obtained when n > m, for the
restricted parameters n = lm and ℓ = mlk′, where l and
k′ < m are positive integers.
V. UNIVERSAL SECURE LIST-DECODABLE RANK-METRIC
LINEAR COSET CODING SCHEMES
In this section, we will obtain nested linear code pairs C2 $
C1 ⊆ Fm×nq when n dividesm that can list-decode rank errors
on noisy networks (as opposed to the scenario in last section),
whose list sizes are polynomial on the code length n, while
being univeral secure under a given number of wire-tapped
links. As in last section, we consider perfect universal secrecy,
and thus make use of the results in Section III concerning the
first RGMW of the dual code pair.
We give the construction in Subsection V-A, together with
its parameters (Theorem 3): information parameter ℓ, security
parameter t and number of list-decodable rank errors e. To
measure the quality of the proposed code pair, we will compare
in Subsection V-B their parameters with those obtained when
choosing C1 and C2 as MRD codes [17], [36], which provide
coset coding schemes with both optimal universal security
and optimal error-correction capability [39]. We will also
show (Subsection V-C) the near optimality of the obtained
construction in terms of the introduced uncertainty on the
secret message and the number of list-decodable rank errors.
A. The construction and its main properties
We start by extending the definition of rank list-decodable
codes from [11, Definition 2] to coset coding schemes:
Definition 23. For positive integers e and L, we say that a
coset coding scheme PS = {Cx}x∈S over Fq is rank (e, L)-
list-decodable if, for every Y ∈ Fm×nq , we have that
| {x ∈ S | Px ∩ B(Y, e) 6= ∅} | ≤ L,
where B(Y, e) denotes the ball in Fm×nq with center Y and
rank radius e. The number of list-decodable rank errors is
e and the list sizes are said to be polynomial in n if L =
O(F (n)), for some polynomial F (x).
Remark 24. Observe however that, if a coset coding scheme
can list-decode e rank errors with polynomial-sized lists of
cosets, we still need to decode these cosets to obtain the
uncoded secret messages. In general, it is possible that the
union of such cosets has exponential size while the scheme
can still obtain all the corresponding uncoded messages via
an algorithm with polynomial complexity. This is the case in
the construction below.
9We now give the above mentioned construction, which
exists whenever n divides m. The main objective is to obtain
simultaneously large information parameter ℓ, security param-
eter t and number of list-decodable rank errors e.
Construction 1. Assume that n divides m and fix ε > 0 and
positive integers s and 1 ≤ k2 < k1 ≤ n such that 4sn ≤ εm
and m/n = O(s/ε). In the next subsection, mk1 and mk2
will be the dimensions of the MRD linear codes constituting
an optimal universal secure nested coset coding scheme, but
here they are just fixed parameters.
Fix a basis α1, α2, . . . , αm of Fqm as a vector space over Fq,
such that α1, α2, . . . , αn generate Fqn (recall that Fqn ⊆ Fqm
since n divides m).
Recall that a q-linearized polynomial over Fqm is a polyno-
mial of the form F (x) =
∑d
i=0 Fix
qi , where Fi ∈ Fqm , for
some positive integer d. Denote also evα(F (x)) = (F (α1),
F (α2), . . . , F (αn)) ∈ Fnqm , and finally define the linear codes
C2 = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi = 0 for i < k1−k2 and i ≥ k1},
C1 = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi ∈ Hi for 0 ≤ i < k1 − k2,
Fi ∈ Fqm for k1 − k2 ≤ i < k1, Fi = 0 for i ≥ k1},
where Mα is the map given in (1) and H0,H1, . . . ,
Hk1−k2−1 ⊆ Fqm are the Fq-linear vector spaces described
in [20, Theorem 8]. We recall this description in Appendix B.
Observe that these vector spaces depend on ε and s.
Let ℓ = dim(C1/C2) = dim(H0 × H1 × · · · × Hk1−k2−1).
We now show how C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq form a coset coding
scheme as in Definition 3. Define the vector space
W = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi ∈ Hi for i < k1 − k2
and Fi = 0 for i ≥ k1 − k2},
which satisfies that C1 = C2 ⊕ W . Now consider the secret
space asH0×H1×· · ·×Hk1−k2−1 ∼= F
ℓ
q, and define the vector
space isomorphism ψ : H0×H1× · · ·×Hk1−k2−1 −→W as
follows: For x ∈ H0 × H1 × · · · × Hk1−k2−1, take F (x) =∑k1−k2−1
i=0 Fix
qi such that x = (F0, F1, . . . , Fk1−k2−1), and
define
C = ψ(x) =Mα(evα(F (x))).
We may now state the main result of this section:
Theorem 3. With the same assumptions and notation, the
nested coset coding scheme in Construction 1 satisfies that:
1) ℓ = dim(C1/C2) ≥ m(k1 − k2)(1− 2ε).
2) Its security parameter (Definition 19) satisfies t ≥ k2.
3) It is rank (e, L)-list-decodable for all e ≤ ss+1 (n− k1),
with L ≤ qO(s
2/ε2), and it admits a list-decoding algo-
rithm that obtains all corresponding uncoded messages
with polynomial complexity in n.
We devote the rest of the subsection to prove this theorem.
We need to recall some definitions and results from [20]:
Definition 25 (Subspace designs [20, Definition 3]). Assum-
ing that n divides m and given positive integers r and N , a
collection of Fq-linear subspaces U1,U2, . . . ,UM ⊆ Fqm is
called an (r,N, n) Fq-linear subspace design if
M∑
i=1
dim(Ui ∩ V) ≤ N,
with dimensions taken over Fq, for every Fqn -linear subspace
V ⊆ Fqm of dimension at most r over Fqn .
The following lemma is part of [20, Theorem 8]:
Lemma 26 ([20]). With assumptions and notation as in
Construction 1, the spaces H0,H1, . . .Hk1−k2−1 defined in
Appendix B form an (s, 2(m/n−1)s/ε, n) Fq-linear subspace
design.
Definition 27 (Periodic subspaces [20, Definition 9]). Given
positive integers r, l, k, we say that an affine subspace H ⊆
Flkqn is (r, l, k)-periodic if there exists an Fqn -linear subspace
V ⊆ Flqn of dimension at most r over Fqn such that, for every
j = 2, 3, . . . , k and a ∈ F(j−1)lqn , the affine space
{π[(j−1)l+1,jl](x) | x ∈ H, π[1,(j−1)l](x) = a} ⊆ F
l
qn
is contained in va + V , for a vector va ∈ Flqn that depends
on a. Here, πJ denotes the projection over the coordinates in
J , and [a, b] denotes the set of integers i such that a ≤ i ≤ b.
We may now prove our main result:
Proof of Theorem 3. We prove each item separately:
1) By Lemma 69 in Appendix B, it holds that dim(Hi) ≥
m(1− 2ε), for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k1 − k2 − 1. Therefore
ℓ = dim(H0 ×H1× · · · ×Hk1−k2−1) ≥ m(k1− k2)(1− 2ε).
2) By Theorem 1, the security parameter is t =
dR(C⊥2 , C
⊥
1 )− 1 ≥ dR(C
⊥
2 )− 1. Since C2 is MRD, then so is
its trace dual [9], which means that dR(C⊥2 ) = k2+1, and the
result follows.
3) As shown in [20, Subsection IV-B], we may perform
list-decoding for the Gabidulin code G1 ⊇ C1,
G1 = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi = 0 for i ≥ k1},
and obtain in polynomial time a list containing all possible
sent messages that is an (s−1,m/n, k1)-periodic subspace of
Fk1m/nqn ∼= F
k1
qm (isomorphic as Fqn -linear vector spaces).
Project this periodic subspace onto the first k1− k2 coordi-
nates, which gives a (s− 1,m/n, k1 − k2)-periodic subspace
of Fk1−k2qm , and intersect it with H0 ×H1 × · · · × Hk1−k2−1.
Since H0,H1, . . .Hk1−k2−1 form an (s, 2(m/n − 1)s/ε, n)
Fq-linear subspace design by Lemma 26, such intersection
is an Fq-linear affine space of dimension at most O(s2/ε2)
(recall that m/n = O(s/ε)) by the definition of subspace
designs and periodic subspaces.
B. Comparison with optimal unique-decodable linear coset
coding schemes based on MRD codes
In this subsection, we compare the schemes in Construction
1 with those obtained when using MRD codes [17], [36],
whose information parameter ℓ is optimal for given security
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parameter t and number of unique-decodable rank errors e,
due to Theorems 11 and 12 in [39].
Proposition 28 ([39]). Assume that n ≤ m and C2 $ C1 ⊆
Fm×nq are MRD linear codes of dimensions dim(C1) = mk1
and dim(C2) = mk2 (recall that, by the Singleton bound (8),
dimensions of MRD codes are multiple of m when n ≤ m).
The linear coset coding scheme (Definition 3) constructed
from this nested linear code pair satisfies that:
1) Its information parameter is ℓ = m(k1 − k2).
2) Its security parameter is t = k2.
3) If the number of rank errors is e ≤ ⌊n−k12 ⌋, then
rank error-correction can be performed, giving a unique
solution.
Therefore, assuming that n dividesm and given MRD linear
codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq of dimensions dim(C1) = mk1
and dim(C2) = mk2, the linear coset coding scheme in
Construction 1 has at least the same security parameter t as
that obtained using C1 and C2, an information parameter ℓ that
is at least 1− 2ε times the one obtained using C1 and C2, and
can list-decode in polynomial time (with list of polynomial
size) roughly n − k1 errors, which is twice as many as the
rank errors that C1 and C2 can correct, due to the previous
proposition and Theorem 3.
C. Near optimality of the obtained construction
In this subsection, we will show the near optimality of
Construction 1 in terms of its introduced uncertainty H(C|x)
compared to the maximum observed information H(CBT )
by the wire-tapper, and the number of rank errors e that the
scheme can list-decode.
Let x ∈ Fℓq and C ∈ F
m×n
q denote the random variables
representing the secret message and the transmitted codeword,
respectively, as in Subsection III-C.
The quantity H(C|x) measures the amount of randomness
of C given x introduced by the corresponding coset coding
scheme, and we would like it to be as small as possible since
generating randomness is difficult in practice. Observe that
H(C|x) = dim(C2) for nested coset coding schemes. On the
other hand, the quantity H(CBT ) measures the amount of
observed information by wire-tapping µ links if B ∈ Fµ×nq ,
which satisfies H(CBT ) ≤ mµ, being the inequality usually
tight when I(x;CBT ) = 0 or even an equality, as is the case
for Gabidulin codes. Thus the following bound is a weaker
version of a bound of the form mt ≤ dim(C2), which we
leave as open problem.
Proposition 29. Fix an arbitrary coset coding scheme in
Fm×nq with message set S = F
ℓ
q , let x ∈ F
ℓ
q, and let
C ∈ Fm×nq be its encoding. It holds that
max{H(CBT ) | B ∈ Fµ×nq , I(x;CB
T ) = 0} ≤ H(C|x).
Proof. Fix B ∈ Fµ×nq . The result follows from the following
chain of inequalities:
I(x;CBT )
= H(CBT )−H(CBT |x)
= H(CBT )−H(CBT |C,x)
+H(CBT |C,x) −H(CBT |x)
= H(CBT )−H(CBT |C)
+H(CBT |C,x) −H(CBT |x)
(since x→ C → CBT is a Markov chain [8])
= I(C;CBT )− I(C;CBT |x)
≥ H(CBT )−H(C|x).
Now consider the coset coding scheme in Construction 1,
and fix µ ≤ k2 ≤ k1. Define the Gabidulin code
G1 = {Mα(evα(F (x))) | Fi = 0, i ≥ k1} ⊆ Fm×nq ,
and let G be the uniform random variable on G1. It holds that
max
B∈Fµ×nq
H(GBT ) = mµ, (11)
since µ ≤ k1. Equation (11) together with dim(G1/C1) ≤
2mε(k1 − k2) implies that
max
B∈Fµ×nq
H(CBT ) ≥ m(µ− 2ε(k1 − k2)).
Using that H(C|x) = dim(C2) = mk2, we see that the bound
in the previous proposition is tight for Construction 1:
0 ≤H(C|x)−max{H(CBT ) | B ∈ Fµ×nq , I(x;CB
T ) = 0}
≤m(k2 − t+ 2ε(k1 − k2)) ≤ 2εm(k1 − k2).
Next we show that the rank list-decoding capability cannot
be improved for large s and small ε, compared to general
nested coset coding schemes. Since rank list-decodable nested
coset coding schemes still require decoding each coset, we
will consider those such that a complementary space W as in
Definition 3 is rank list-decodable with polynomial-sized lists
after adding an error matrix from the smaller code C2:
Proposition 30. Fix a nested linear code pair C2 & C1 ⊆
Fm×nq and a subspace W ⊆ C1 such that C1 = C2 ⊕W , and
denote by M the maximum rank of a matrix in C2. If W is
rank (e +M,L)-list-decodable with polynomial list sizes L,
then
e ≤ n−
dim(C1)
m
.
Proof. By [11, Proposition 1], if the linear code W is rank
(e+M,L)-list-decodable with polynomial-sized lists L, then
e +M ≤ n− dim(W)/m.
On the other hand, the maximum rank of codewords in C2 is
at least dim(C2)/m by [35, Proposition 47]. Hence
e ≤ n−
dim(W)
m
−
dim(C2)
m
= n−
dim(C1)
m
,
and we are done.
For the nested coset coding scheme in Construction 1, it
holds that
e =
s
s+ 1
(n− k1), and
n−
dim(C1)
m
= n− k1(1− 2ε)− 2εk2,
which are closer as s becomes larger and ε becomes smaller.
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VI. SECURITY EQUIVALENCES OF LINEAR COSET CODING
SCHEMES AND MINIMUM PARAMETERS
In this section, we study when two nested linear code pairs
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and C′2 $ C
′
1 ⊆ F
m′×n′ have the same
universal security and/or reliability performance.
First, we define security equivalences and give several
characterizations of these in Theorem 4 (Subsection VI-A),
which show that they also preserve error and erasure correction
capabilities. As applications, we study ranges and minimum
possible parameters m and n for linear codes (Subsection
VI-B), and we study when they are degenerate (Subsection
VI-C), meaning when they can be applied to networks with
strictly smaller length n.
A. Security equivalences and rank isometries
In this subsection, we first give in Theorem 4 the above
mentioned characterizations, and we define afterwards security
equivalences as maps satisfying one of such characterizations.
We continue with Proposition 36, which shows that security
equivalences actually preserve universal security performance
as in Subsection II-B, thus motivating our definition. We
conclude by comparing Theorem 4 with related results from
the literature (see also Table III).
Due to the importance of the rank metric for error and
erasure correction in linear network coding (see Subsection
II-B), and for universal security (by Theorem 1 and Corollary
13), we start by considering rank isometries:
Definition 31 (Rank isometries). We say that a map φ :
V −→ W between vector spaces V ⊆ Fm×n andW ⊆ Fm
′×n′
is a rank isometry if it is a vector space isomorphism and
Rk(φ(V )) = Rk(V ), for all V ∈ V . In that case, we say that
V and W are rank isometric.
We have the following result, which was first proven in [27,
Theorem 1] for square matrices and the complex field F = C.
In [30, Proposition 3] it is observed that the square condition
is not necessary and it may be proven for arbitrary fields:
Proposition 32 ([27], [30]). If φ : Fm×n −→ Fm×n is a rank
isometry, then there exist invertible matrices A ∈ Fm×m and
B ∈ Fn×n such that
1) φ(C) = ACB, for all C ∈ Fm×n, or
2) φ(C) = ACTB, for all C ∈ Fm×n,
where the latter case can only happen if m = n.
We will define security equivalences as certain vector space
isomorphisms satisfying one of several equivalent conditions.
We first show their equivalence in the following theorem,
which is the main result of this section:
Theorem 4. Let φ : V −→ W be a vector space isomor-
phism between rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n) and
W ∈ RS(Fm×n
′
), and consider the following properties:
(P 1) There exist full-rank matrices A ∈ Fm×m andB ∈ Fn×n
′
such that φ(C) = ACB, for all C ∈ V .
(P 2) A subspace U ⊆ V is a rank support space if, and only
if, φ(U) is a rank support space.
(P 3) For all subspaces D ⊆ V , it holds that wtR(φ(D)) =
wtR(D).
(P 4) φ is a rank isometry.
Then the following implications hold:
(P 1)⇐⇒ (P 2)⇐⇒ (P 3) =⇒ (P 4).
In particular, a security equivalence is a rank isometry and,
in the case V = W = Fm×n and m 6= n, the reversed
implication holds by Proposition 32.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 33. Unfortunately, the implication (P 3) ⇐= (P 4)
does not always hold. Take for instance m = n and the map
φ : Fm×m −→ Fm×m given by φ(C) = CT , for all C ∈
Fm×m.
Remark 34. Observe that, in particular, security equivalences
also preserve (relative) generalized matrix weights, (relative)
dimension/rank support profiles and distributions of rank
weights of vector subspaces, and they are the only rank
isometries with these properties.
Property (P 1) will be useful for technical computations
and, in particular, for Proposition 36 below. As explained in
Appendix C, (P 2) allows us to connect (P 1) with (P 3), and (P
3) allows us to connect the first two with the rank metric (P 4),
crucial for error and erasure correction as in Subsection II-B.
Finally, Property (P 2) also explains why we will consider
security equivalences defined between rank support spaces,
and intuitively explains that such spaces behave as ambient
spaces in our theory, as mentioned in Subsection III-A.
Definition 35 (Security equivalences). We say that a map
φ : V −→ W between rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n)
andW ∈ RS(Fm×n
′
) is a security equivalence if it is a vector
space isomorphism and satisfies condition (P 1), (P 2) or (P
3) in Theorem 4.
Two nested linear code pairs C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and C′2 $
C′1 ⊆ F
m×n′ are said to be security equivalent if there exist
rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n) and W ∈ RS(Fm×n
′
),
containing C1 and C′1, respectively, and a security equivalence
φ : V −→ W with φ(C1) = C′1 and φ(C2) = C
′
2.
We now motivate the previous definition with the next
proposition, which makes use of Theorem 4. Observe that
Remark 34 above already shows that security equivalences
preserve the worst-case information leakage as described in
Theorem 1. Now, given nested linear code pairs C2 $ C1 ⊆
Fm×nq and C
′
2 $ C
′
1 ⊆ F
m×n′
q , Proposition 36 below shows that
if the dual pairs are security equivalent, then there exists a bi-
jective correspondence between wire-tappers’ transfer matrices
(matrix B in Subsection II-B, item 2) that preserves the mutual
information with the original sent message. If the original pairs
are also security equivalent, we conclude that encoding with
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq or C
′
2 $ C
′
1 ⊆ F
m×n′
q yields exactly the
same universal error and erasure correction performance, and
exactly the same universal security performance over linearly
coded networks, as in Subsection II-B.
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Proposition 36. Assume that F = Fq and the dual pairs of
C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×nq and C
′
2 $ C
′
1 ⊆ F
m×n′
q are security equiva-
lent by a security equivalence given by matrices A ∈ Fm×mq
and B ∈ Fn×n
′
q as in item 1 in Theorem 4. For any matrix
M ∈ Fµ×nq , it holds that
I
(
x;CMT
)
= I
(
x;C′(MB)T
)
, (12)
with notation as in Proposition 16, where C ∈ Fm×nq and
C′ ∈ Fm×n
′
q are the encodings of x using C2 $ C1 ⊆ F
m×n
q
and C′2 $ C
′
1 ⊆ F
m×n′ , respectively.
Furthermore, assuming n ≤ n′, the correspondence M 7→
MB is one to one and, for any matrix N ∈ Fµ×n
′
q , there exists
M ∈ Fµ×nq such that I
(
x;C′NT
)
= I
(
x;C′(MB)T
)
.
Proof. Denote by φ the security equivalence. Take a matrix
M ∈ Fµ×nq , define L = Row(M) ⊆ F
n
q and L
′ =
Row(MB) ⊆ Fn
′
q . Then φ(VL) = VL′ and
dim(φ(C⊥1 ) ∩ VL′) = dim(φ(C
⊥
1 ∩ VL)) = dim(C
⊥
1 ∩ VL),
and similarly for C2. Thus Equation (12) follows from Propo-
sition 16.
Observe that we may assume n ≤ n′ without loss of
generality, since the inverse of a security equivalence is a
security equivalence. Thus the injectivity of M 7→ MB
follows from the fact that B has full rank.
Finally, if N ∈ Fµ×n
′
q , L = Row(N) and K = Row(B),
then C⊥1 ⊆ VK and
C⊥1 ∩ VL = C
⊥
1 ∩ (VL ∩ VK),
and similarly for C⊥2 . Since VL ∩ VK = VL∩K and L ∩ K =
Row(MB) for a matrixM ∈ Fµ×nq , the last statement follows
again from Proposition 16.
The topic of vector space isomorphisms φ : Fm×n −→
Fm×n preserving some specified property has been intensively
studied in the literature (see also Table III), where the term
Frobenius map is generally used for maps of the form of those
in Proposition 32.
Whenm = n, it is proven in [10, Theorem 3] that Frobenius
maps are characterized by being those preserving invertible
matrices and in [27] they are characterized by being those
preserving ranks (this is extended to m 6= n in [30, Proposi-
tion 3]), those preserving determinants and those preserving
eigenvalues.
On the other hand, [3, Theorem 1] shows that Fqm -linear
vector space isomorphisms φ : Fnqm −→ F
n
qm preserving ranks
are given by φ(c) = βcA, for β ∈ Fqm \{0} and an invertible
A ∈ Fn×nq . This is extended in [28, Theorem 5] to Fqm -linear
vector space isomorphisms whose domain and codomain are
Fqm -linear Galois closed spaces in Fnqm , which correspond to
rank support spaces in Fm×nq (see Lemma 52 below).
Therefore, we extend these works in three directions simul-
taneously: First, we consider the stronger properties (P 1), (P
2) and (P 3) than those considered in [3], [10], [27], [30],
which are essentially (P 4). Second, we extend the domains
and codomains from Fm×n to general rank support spaces
whose matrices do not necessarily have the same sizes. Finally,
in the case F = Fq , we consider general Fq-linear maps,
instead of the particular case of Fqm -linear maps as in [3],
[28].
B. Minimum parameters of linear codes
As main application of the previous subsection, we study in
this subsection the minimum parameters m and n for which
there exists a linear code that is security equivalent to a given
one. Recall from Subsection II-A that m corresponds to the
packet length used in the network, and n corresponds to the
number of outgoing links from the source.
Both cases of one linear code, that is C2 = {0} and
C1 = Fm×n, are covered since they are dual of each other (see
also Remark 4 and Appendix A). Since security equivalences
are rank isometries by Theorem 4, in the first case we find
minimum parameters for error and erasure correction, and in
the second case we find minimum parameters for universal
security on noiseless linearly coded networks.
Proposition 37. Fix a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n of dimension
k. There exists a linear code C′ ⊆ Fm×n
′
that is security
equivalent to C if, and only if, n′ ≥ dM,k(C).
Proof. First, if C′ ⊆ Fm×n
′
is security equivalent to C, then
dim(C′) = k and dM,k(C) = dM,k(C′) ≤ n′.
On the other hand, assume that n′ ≥ dM,k(C). Take a
subspace L ⊆ Fn with d = dim(L) = dM,k(C) and
dim(C ∩ VL) ≥ k, which implies that C ⊆ VL. Take a
generator matrix A ∈ Fd×n of L. There exists a full-rank
matrix A′ ∈ Fn×d such that AA′ = I ∈ Fd×d.
The linear map φ : VL −→ Fm×d, given by φ(V ) = V A′,
for V ∈ VL, is a vector space isomorphism. By dimensions,
we just need to see that it is onto. Take W ∈ Fm×d. It holds
that W = WI = WAA′ = φ(WA), and WA ∈ VL by
definition.
On the other hand, φ is a security equivalence by Theorem
4. Therefore φ(C) ⊆ Fm×d is security equivalent to C. Finally,
we see that appending n′− d zero columns to the matrices in
φ(C) gives a security equivalent code to C in Fm×n
′
.
By transposing matrices, we obtain the following conse-
quence, where we consider linear codes that are rank isometric
to a given one. By [28, Theorem 9], such equivalent codes
perform equally when used for error and erasure correction,
and by Theorem 1 and Corollary 13, they perform equally
regarding the maximum number of links that an adversary
may wire-tap without obtaining any information on noiseless
networks.
Corollary 38. For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n, define the
transposed linear code
CT = {CT | C ∈ C} ⊆ Fn×m.
If m′ ≥ dM,k(CT ), where k = dim(C), then there exists a
linear code C′ ⊆ Fm
′
×n that is rank isometric to C.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 4 and Proposition 37.
As a related result, [28, Proposition 3] computes the min-
imum parameter n for which there exists an Fqm -linear code
C ⊆ Fnqm that is rank isometric to a given one. In contrast,
13
we consider both parameters m and n, we consider security
equivalences for the parameter n, and not only rank isometries,
and as the biggest difference with [28], we consider general
linear codes, and not only Fqm-linear codes in Fnqm .
C. Degenerate codes
In this subsection, we study degenerate codes, which by the
study in the previous subsection, can be applied to networks
with less outgoing links or, by transposing matrices, with
smaller packet length. Degenerateness of codes in the rank
metric has been studied in [22, Section 6] and [28, Subsection
IV-B], but only for Fqm-linear codes in Fnqm . We extend those
studies to general linear codes in Fm×n.
Definition 39 (Degenerate codes). We say that a linear code
C ⊆ Fm×n is degenerate if it is security equivalent to a linear
code C′ ⊆ Fm×n
′
with n′ < n.
The following lemma follows from Proposition 37:
Lemma 40. A linear code C ⊆ Fm×n is degenerate if, and
only if, dM,k(C) < n, where k = dim(C).
Now we may give characterizations in terms of the mini-
mum rank distance of the dual code thanks to Proposition 65
in Appendix A.
Proposition 41. Given a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n, the following
hold:
1) Assuming dim(C⊥) ≥ m, C is degenerate if, and only
if, dM,m(C⊥) = 1.
2) If dR(C⊥) > 1, then C is not degenerate.
Proof. From Proposition 65, we know that
W k(C) ∪W0(C
⊥) = {1, 2, . . . , n},
where the sets on the left-hand side are disjoint, and where
k = dim(C). Now, the smallest number in W k(C) is
n + 1 − dM,k(C), and the smallest number in W0(C
⊥) is
dM,m(C⊥). Item 1 follows from this and the previous lemma.
Item 2 follows from item 1 and Proposition 43 in Subsection
VII-A.
VII. MONOTONICITY AND SINGLETON-TYPE BOUNDS
In this section, we give upper and lower Singleton-type
bounds on RGMWs. We start with the monotonicity of RDRPs
and RGMWs (Subsection VII-A), which have their own inter-
est, but which are a crucial tool to prove the main bounds
(Theorems 5 and 6 in Subsection VII-B). Finally we study
linear codes C ⊆ Fm×n, meaning C1 = C and C2 = {0}, that
attain these bounds and whose dimensions are divisible by m
(Subsection VII-C).
A. Monotonicity of RGMWs and RDRPs
The monotonicity bounds presented in this subsection are
crucial tools for Theorems 5 and 6, but they also have an
interpretation in terms of the worst-case information leakage,
due to Theorem 1: An adversary wire-tapping more links in
the network will obtain more information in the worst case,
and to obtain more information than the worst case for a given
number of links, the adversary needs to wire-tap more links.
We also bound the corresponding differences.
Proposition 42 (Monotonicity of RDRPs). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n, and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n− 1, it holds
that KM,0(C1, C2) = 0, KM,n(C1, C2) = dim(C1/C2) and
0 ≤ KM,µ+1(C1, C2)−KM,µ(C1, C2) ≤ m.
Proof. The only property that is not trivial from the definitions
is KM,µ+1(C1, C2) − KM,µ(C1, C2) ≤ m. Consider L ⊆ Fn
with dim(L) ≤ µ + 1 and dim(C1 ∩ VL) − dim(C2 ∩ VL) =
KM,µ+1(C1, C2).
Take L′ $ L with dim(L′) = dim(L) − 1. Using (2), a
simple computation shows that
dim(C1 ∩ VL′) +m ≥ dim(C1 ∩ VL).
Since dim(C2 ∩ VL′) ≤ dim(C2 ∩ VL), it holds that
dim(C1 ∩ VL′)− dim(C2 ∩ VL′) +m
≥ dim(C1 ∩ VL)− dim(C2 ∩ VL),
and the result follows.
Proposition 43 (Monotonicity of RGMWs). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n with ℓ = dim(C1/C2), it holds
that
0 ≤ dM,r+1(C1, C2)− dM,r(C1, C2) ≤ min{m,n},
for 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ− 1, and
dM,r(C1, C2) + 1 ≤ dM,r+m(C1, C2),
for 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ−m.
Proof. The first inequality in the first equation is obvious.
We now prove the second inequality. By Proposition 12, there
exists a subspace D ⊆ C1 with D ∩ C2 = {0}, dim(D) = r
and wtR(D) = dM,r(C1, C2). Now take D ∈ C1 not contained
in D ⊕ C2, and consider D′ = D ⊕ 〈{D}〉. We see from
the definitions that RSupp(D′) ⊆ RSupp(D)+Row(D), and
hence
wtR(D
′) ≤ wtR(D) + Rk(D) ≤ dM,r(C1, C2) + min{m,n}.
Therefore it follows that dM,r+1(C1, C2) ≤ dM,r(C1, C2) +
min{m,n}.
The last inequality follows from Proposition 14 and Propo-
sition 42.
Due to Theorem 9, the first and third inequalities in the
previous proposition coincide with items 3 and 4 in [34,
Theorem 30] when C2 = {0} and m 6= n.
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B. Upper and lower Singleton-type bounds
Due to Theorem 1, it is desirable to obtain nested linear
code pairs with large RGMWs. The following result gives a
fundamental upper bound on them, whose achievability for
one linear code (C2 = {0}) is studied in the next subsection.
Theorem 5 (Upper Singleton-type bound). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2),
it holds that
dM,r(C1, C2) ≤ n−
⌈
ℓ− r + 1
m
⌉
+ 1. (13)
In particular, it follows that
dim(C1/C2) ≤ max{m,n}(min{m,n} − dR(C1, C2) + 1),
which extends (8) to nested linear code pairs.
Proof. First of all, we have that dM,ℓ(C1, C2) ≤ n by defini-
tion. Therefore the case r = ℓ follows.
For the general case, we will prove that mdM,r(C1, C2) ≤
mn− ℓ+ r+m− 1. Assume that 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ−hm, where the
integer h ≥ 0 is the maximum possible. That is, r+(h+1)m >
ℓ. Using Proposition 43, we obtain
mdM,r(C1, C2) ≤ mdM,r+hm(C1, C2)− hm
≤ mdM,ℓ(C1, C2)− hm ≤ mn− ℓ+ r +m− 1,
where the last inequality follows from mdM,ℓ(C1, C2) ≤ mn
and r + (h+ 1)m− 1 ≥ ℓ.
Finally, the last bound is obtained by setting r = 1 and
using Corollary 13 for the given nested linear code pair and
the pair obtained by transposing matrices.
Due to Theorem 9, the previous theorem coincides with item
5 in [34, Theorem 30] when C2 = {0} and m 6= n.
Remark 44. In view of [24, Proposition 1] or [26, Equation
(24)], it is natural to wonder whether a sharper bound of the
form
dM,r(C1, C2) ≤ n−
⌈
dim(C1)− r + 1
m
⌉
+ 1
holds. However, this is not the case in general, as the following
example shows.
Example 45. Considerm = 2, the canonical basis e1, e2, . . . ,
en of Fn, and the linear codes C1 = F2×n and
C2 =
〈(
e1
0
)
,
(
e2
0
)
, . . . ,
(
en
0
)〉
.
Observe that ℓ = dim(C1/C2) = n. A bound as in the previous
remark would imply that dM,n(C1, C2) ≤ ⌈n/2⌉. However,
a direct inspection shows that dM,n(C1, C2) = n, since all
vectors e1, e2, . . . , en must lie in the row space of any D
with C1 = C2 ⊕D.
On the other hand, we have the following lower bound:
Theorem 6 (Lower Singleton-type bound). Given nested
linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fm×n and 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C1/C2),
it holds that mdM,r(C1, C2) ≥ r, which implies that
dM,r(C1, C2) ≥
⌈ r
m
⌉
. (14)
Proof. Take a subspace D ⊆ Fm×n and define L =
RSupp(D). We have that D ⊆ VL. Using (2), we see that
mwtR(D) = m dim(L) = dim(VL) ≥ dim(D).
The result follows from this and Proposition 12.
Due to Theorem 9, the previous theorem coincides with item
6 in [34, Theorem 30] when C2 = {0} and m 6= n.
C. Linear codes attaining the bounds and whose dimensions
are divisible by the packet length
In this subsection, we study the achievability of the bounds
(13) and (14) for one linear code whose dimension is divisible
by the packet lengthm. As we will show in Subsection VIII-C,
DGWs [34] of one linear code coincide with its GMWs when
m 6= n. Thus the two propositions below coincide with
Corollaries 31 and 32 in [34] when m 6= n.
Recall from (8) that, if a linear code is MRD and n ≤ m,
then its dimension is divisible by m. In the next proposition,
we show that GMWs of MRD linear codes for n ≤ m are all
given by m, n and dim(C), and all attain the upper Singleton-
type bound (13):
Proposition 46. Let C ⊆ Fm×n be a linear code with
dim(C) = mk. The following are equivalent if n ≤ m:
1) C is maximum rank distance (MRD).
2) dR(C) = n− k + 1.
3) dM,r(C) = n− k +
⌊
r−1
m
⌋
+ 1, for all 1 ≤ r ≤ mk.
Proof. Item 1 and item 2 are equivalent by definition, and item
3 implies item 2 by choosing r = 1.
Now assume item 2 and let 1 ≤ r ≤ mk. Let r = hm+ s,
with h ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ s < m. We need to distinguish the cases
s > 0 and s = 0. We prove only the first case, being the
second analogous. By Proposition 43, we have that
dM,r(C) ≥ h+ dM,s(C) ≥ h+ dR(C) = n− k + h+ 1.
On the other hand, ⌈(mk− r+1)/m⌉ = k−h, and therefore
the bound (13) implies that
dM,r(C) ≤ n− k + h+ 1,
and hence dM,r(C) = n − k + ⌊(r − 1)/m⌋ + 1 since ⌊(r −
1)/m⌋ = h, and item 3 follows.
Regarding the lower Singleton-type bound, we show in the
next proposition that rank support spaces are also characterized
by having the minimum possible GMWs in view of (14):
Proposition 47. Let C ⊆ Fm×n be a linear code with
dim(C) = mk. The following are equivalent:
1) C is a rank support space. That is, there exists a
subspace L ⊆ Fn such that C = VL.
2) dM,km(C) = k.
3) dM,r(C) = ⌈r/m⌉, for all 1 ≤ r ≤ mk.
Proof. Assume that C = VL, as in item 1. By taking a
sequence of subspaces
{0} $ L1 $ L2 $ . . . $ Lk = L,
15
we see that dM,rm−p(C) ≤ dim(Lr) = r, for 1 ≤ r ≤ k and
0 ≤ p ≤ m − 1, since dim(C ∩ VLr) = dim(VLr ) = mr ≥
mr − p. Hence item 3 follows.
Item 3 implies item 2 by taking r = km.
Finally, assume item 2. Take a subspace L ⊆ Fn such that
dim(L) = dM,km(C) = k and dim(C ∩VL) ≥ mk. By defini-
tion and by (2), it holds that dim(C ∩VL) ≥ mk = dim(VL),
which implies that C ∩ VL = VL, or in other words, VL ⊆ C.
Since dim(C) = mk = dim(VL), we see that VL = C and
item 1 follows.
VIII. RELATION WITH OTHER EXISTING NOTIONS OF
GENERALIZED WEIGHTS
In this section, we study the relation between RGMWs and
RDRPs and other notions of generalized weights (see Table
I). We first show that RGMWs and RDRPs extend RGRWs
and RDIPs [24], [32] (Theorem 7 in Subsection VIII-A),
respectively, then we show that they extend RGHWs and
RDLPs [16], [26], [42] (Theorem 8 in Subsection VIII-B),
respectively, and we conclude by showing that GMWs coin-
cide with DGWs [34] for one linear code, meaning C1 = C
arbitrary and C2 = {0}, when m 6= n, and are strictly larger
when m = n (Theorem 9 in Subsection VIII-C).
A. RGMWs extend relative generalized rank weights
In this subsection, we prove that RGMWs and RDRPs
extend RGRWs and RDIPs [24], [32], respectively.
Definition 48 (Galois closed spaces [41]). We say that an
Fqm -linear vector space V ⊆ Fnqm is Galois closed if
Vq = {(vq1 , v
q
2 , . . . , v
q
n) | (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ V} ⊆ V .
We denote by Υ(Fnqm) the family of Fqm -linear Galois closed
vector spaces in Fnqm .
RGRWs and RDIPs are then defined in [24] as follows:
Definition 49 (Relative Generalized Rank Weigths [24, Def-
inition 2]). Given nested Fqm-linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm ,
and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2) (over Fqm ), we define their r-th
relative generalized rank weight (RGRW) as
dR,r(C1, C2) = min{dim(V) | V ∈ Υ(Fnqm),
dim(C1 ∩ V)− dim(C2 ∩ V) ≥ r},
where dimensions are taken over Fqm .
Definition 50 (Relative Dimension/Intersection Profile [24,
Definition 1]). Given nested Fqm -linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆
Fnqm , and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative dimen-
sion/intersection profile (RDIP) as
KR,µ(C1, C2) = max{dim(C1 ∩ V)− dim(C2 ∩ V) |
V ∈ Υ(Fnqm), dim(V) ≤ µ},
where dimensions are taken over Fqm .
The following is the main result of the subsection, which
shows that Theorem 1 extends the study on worst-case infor-
mation leakage on Fq-linearly coded networks in [24] (see its
Theorem 2 and Corollary 5) from Fqm -linear codes in Fnqm to
general Fq-linear codes in Fm×nq , when considering uniform
probability distributions.
Theorem 7. Let α1, α2, . . . , αm be a basis of Fqm as a vector
space over Fq. Given nested Fqm-linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fnqm ,
and integers 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2) (over Fqm), 0 ≤ p ≤
m− 1 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we have that
dR,r(C1, C2) = dM,rm−p(Mα(C1),Mα(C2)),
mKR,µ(C1, C2) = KM,µ(Mα(C1),Mα(C2)),
where Mα : Fnqm −→ F
m×n
q is as in (1).
The theorem follows from the next two lemmas, where we
take the first one from [41]:
Lemma 51 ([41, Lemma 1]). An Fqm -linear vector space
V ⊆ Fnqm is Galois closed if, and only if, it has a basis of
vectors in Fnq as a vector space over Fqm .
Lemma 52. Let α1, α2, . . . , αm be a basis of Fqm as a vector
space over Fq, and let V ⊆ Fnqm be an arbitrary set. The
following are equivalent:
1) V ⊆ Fnqm is an Fqm -linear Galois closed vector space.
That is, V ∈ Υ(Fnqm).
2) Mα(V) ⊆ Fm×nq is a rank support space. That is,
Mα(V) ∈ RS(Fm×nq ).
Moreover, if Mα(V) = VL for a subspace L ⊆ Fnq , then
dim(V) = dim(L),
where dim(V) is taken over Fqm and dim(L) over Fq.
Proof. We first observe the following. For an arbitrary set V ⊆
Fnqm , the previous lemma states that V is an Fqm-linear Galois
closed vector space if, and only if, V is Fq-linear and it has a
basis over Fq of the form vi,j = αibj , for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
j = 1, 2, . . . , k, where b1,b2, . . . ,bk ∈ Fnq . By considering
Bi,j = Mα(vi,j) ∈ Fm×nq , we see that this condition is
equivalent to item 2 in Proposition 9, and we are done.
Remark 53. The results in this subsection can be extended to
Galois extensions of fields F ⊆ F˜ of finite degree m. For that
purpose, we only need to define Galois closed spaces as those
F˜-linear subspaces V ⊆ F˜n that are closed under the action
of every field morphism in the Galois group of the extension
F ⊆ F˜. The rest of definitions and results in this subsection
can be directly translated word by word to this case, except
for Lemma 51, which would be replaced by [18, Theorem 1].
Thus the results in this subsection can be applied to gener-
alizations of rank-metric codes such as those in [2].
B. RGMWs extend relative generalized Hamming weights
In this subsection, we show that RGMWs and RDRPs also
extend RGHWs and RDLPs [16], [26], [42], respectively. We
start with the definitions of Hamming supports and Hamming
support spaces:
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Definition 54 (Hamming supports). Given a vector space
C ⊆ Fn, we define its Hamming support as
HSupp(C) = {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} |
∃(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C, ci 6= 0}.
We also define the Hamming weight of the space C as
wtH(C) = |HSupp(C)|.
Finally, for a vector c ∈ Fn, we define its Hamming support
as HSupp(c) = HSupp(〈{c}〉), and its Hamming weight as
wtH(c) = wtH(〈{c}〉).
Definition 55 (Hamming support spaces). Given a subset
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we define its Hamming support space as
the vector space in Fn given by
LI = {(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fn | ci = 0, ∀i /∈ I}.
We may now define RGHWs and RDLPs:
Definition 56 (Relative Generalized Hamming Weigths [26,
Section III]). Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fn,
and 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2), we define their r-th relative
generalized Hamming weight (RGHW) as
dH,r(C1, C2) = min{|I| | I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n},
dim(C1 ∩ LI)− dim(C2 ∩ LI) ≥ r}.
As in Proposition 12, it holds that
dH,r(C1, C2) = min{wtH(D) | D ⊆ C1,D ∩ C2 = {0},
dim(D) = r}.
Given a linear code C ⊆ Fn, we see that its r-th GHW [42,
Section II] is dH,r(C) = dH,r(C, {0}), for 1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C).
Definition 57 (Relative Dimension/Length Profile [16],
[26]). Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fn, and
0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we define their µ-th relative dimension/length
profile (RDLP) as
KH,µ(C1, C2) = max{ dim(C1 ∩ LI)− dim(C2 ∩ LI) |
I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, |I| ≤ µ}.
To prove our results, we need to see vectors in Fn as
matrices in Fn×n. To that end, we introduce the diagonal
matrix representation map ∆ : Fn −→ Fn×n given by
∆(c) = diag(c) = (ciδi,j)1≤i≤n,1≤j≤n, (15)
where c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fn and δi,j represents the
Kronecker delta. In other words, ∆(c) is the diagonal matrix
whose diagonal vector is c.
The map ∆ : Fn −→ Fn×n is linear, one to one and, for
any vector space D ⊆ Fn, it holds that
wtR(∆(D)) = wtH(D).
We may now give the main result of this subsection:
Theorem 8. Given nested linear codes C2 $ C1 ⊆ Fn, and
integers 1 ≤ r ≤ ℓ = dim(C1/C2), and 0 ≤ µ ≤ n, we have
that
dH,r(C1, C2) = dM,r(∆(C1),∆(C2)),
KH,µ(C1, C2) = KM,µ(∆(C1),∆(C2)).
Proof. We prove the first equality, being the second analogous.
Denote by dr the number on the left-hand side and by d
′
r the
number on the right-hand side, and prove both inequalities:
dr ≤ d′r: Take a vector space L ⊆ F
n such that dim(L) =
d′r and dim((∆(C1) ∩ VL)/(∆(C2) ∩ VL)) ≥ r. It holds that
VL∩∆(Fn) = ∆(LI), for some subset I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We
have that dim((C1 ∩ LI)/(C2 ∩ LI)) ≥ r and
dr ≤ |I| = wtR(∆(LI)) ≤ wtR(VL) = dim(L) = d
′
r.
dr ≥ d′r: Take a subset I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that |I| = dr
and dim((C1∩LI)/(C2∩LI)) ≥ r. Now it holds that∆(LI) =
VLI∩∆(F
n). Therefore dim((∆(C1)∩VLI )/(∆(C2)∩VLI )) ≥
r and
d′r ≤ dim(LI) = |I| = dr.
C. Relation with Delsarte generalized weights
A notion of generalized weights, called Delsarte generalized
weights (DGWs), for a linear code, which in this section means
C1 = C arbitrary and C2 = {0} has already been proposed in
[34] as an algebraic invariant of the code. We will prove that
GMWs are strictly larger than DGWs when m = n, and we
will prove that both coincide in the other cases.
These weights are defined in terms of optimal anticodes for
the rank metric:
Definition 58 (Maximum rank distance). For a linear code
C ⊆ Fm×n, we define its maximum rank distance as
MaxRk(C) = max{Rk(C) | C ∈ C, C 6= 0}.
The following bound is given in [35, Proposition 47]:
dim(C) ≤ mMaxRk(C). (16)
This leads to the definition of rank-metric optimal anticodes:
Definition 59 (Optimal anticodes [34, Definition 22]). We
say that a linear code V ⊆ Fm×n is a (rank-metric) optimal
anticode if equality in (16) holds.
We will denote by A(Fm×n) the family of linear optimal
anticodes in Fm×n.
In view of this, DGWs are defined in [34] as follows:
Definition 60 (Delsarte generalized weights [34, Definition
23]). For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n and an integer 1 ≤ r ≤
dim(C), we define its r-th Delsarte generalized weight (DGW)
as
dD,r(C) = m
−1min{ dim(V) | V ∈ A(Fm×n),
dim(C ∩ V) ≥ r}.
Observe that dD,r(C) is an integer since the dimension of
optimal anticodes is a multiple of m by definition.
Before giving the main result, we need the following
proposition:
Proposition 61. If a set V ⊆ Fm×n is a rank support space,
then it is a (rank-metric) optimal anticode. In other words,
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RS(Fm×n) ⊆ A(Fm×n). The reversed inclusion also holds if
m 6= n.
Proof. We first prove that RS(Fm×n) ⊆ A(Fm×n). Let V ∈
RS(Fm×n) and let Bi,j , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , k,
be a basis of V as in Proposition 9, item 2. For any V =∑m
i=1
∑k
j=1 λi,jBi,j ∈ V , with λi,j ∈ F, it holds that
Rk(V ) ≤ dim(〈b1,b2, . . . ,bk〉) = k,
where b1,b2, . . . ,bk are as in Proposition 9, item 2. Therefore
dim(V) = mk ≥ mMaxRk(V) and V is an optimal anticode.
We now prove that A(Fm×n) ⊆ RS(Fm×n) when m 6= n.
Let V ∈ A(Fm×n). By [34, Theorem 26], there exist full-rank
matrices A ∈ Fm×mq and B ∈ F
n×n
q such that V = {ACB ∈
Fm×nq | C ∈ VL}, where L = F
k
q ×{0}
n−k for some positive
integer k. By Proposition 9, V is a rank support space and we
are done.
In [34, Theorem 18] it is proven that V ⊆ Fnqm is an Fqm -
linear Galois closed vector space if, and only if, it is an Fqm -
linear vector space satisfying equality in (16). Hence due to
Lemma 52, the previous proposition strengthens [34, Theorem
18] when m 6= n by showing that the Fqm-linearity of V may
be weakened to Fq-linearity. Moreover, our result holds for
any field F 6= Fq.
The main result of this subsection is the next theorem, which
follows from the previous proposition and the corresponding
definitions:
Theorem 9. For a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n and an integer
1 ≤ r ≤ dim(C), we have that
dD,r(C) ≤ dM,r(C) if m = n, and
dD,r(C) = dM,r(C) if m 6= n.
Due to Theorem 1, when considering universal security on
linearly coded networks it is desirable to obtain linear codes
C ⊆ Fm×nq with large GMWs. Therefore, linear codes with
large DGWs serve this purpose, but linear codes with low
DGWs may still have large GMWs when m = n.
The next example shows that not all linear optimal anticodes
are rank support spaces when m = n, that is, RS(Fn×n) $
A(Fn×n), for any n and any field F. As a consequence, in
some cases GMWs are strictly larger than DGWs. To that
end, we will use the characterization of rank support spaces
as matrix modules from Appendix D.
Example 62. Consider m = n = 2 and the linear code
C =
〈(
1 0
0 0
)
,
(
0 1
0 0
)〉
⊆ F2×2.
It holds that dim(C) = 2, m = 2 and MaxRk(C) = 1.
Therefore C is an optimal anticode. However, it is not a matrix
module, and therefore it is not a rank support space (see
Appendix D), since(
0 0
1 0
)(
1 0
0 0
)
=
(
0 0
1 0
)
/∈ C.
In other words, RS(F2×2) $ A(F2×2).
On the one hand, we have that dD,1(C) = dD,2(C) = 1, by
[34, Corollary 32], or just by inspection.
On the other hand, it is easy to check that dM,1(C) = 1, and
since RSupp(C) = F2, it holds that dM,2(C) = 2. Therefore
dM,2(C) > dD,2(C).
Observe that we may trivially extend this example to any
value of m = n, and it holds for an arbitrary field F.
IX. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this work, we have extended the study of universal
security provided by Fqm-linear nested coset coding schemes
from [24], [39] to that provided by Fq-linear schemes, where
Fq is the field used on the network and m is the packet length.
Thanks to this study, we have completed the list of param-
eters ℓ, t, m and n for which we can obtain optimal universal
secure Fq-linear codes for noiseless networks from [39], and
we have added near optimal universal security to the rank
list-decodable codes from [20], providing the first universal
secure linear coset coding schemes able to list-decode in
polynomial time roughly twice the rank errors that optimal
universal secure schemes can unique-decode, with almost the
same secret message size ℓ and security parameter t.
Motivated by our study, we defined a family of security
equivalences between linear coset coding schemes and gave
mathematical characterizations of such equivalences, which
allowed us to obtain, in terms of the last generalized matrix
weight, ranges of parametersm and n of networks on which a
linear code can be applied with the same security performance.
Finally, we give the following list of open problems:
1) Obtain optimal universal secure and error-correcting
linear coset coding schemes for noisy networks for all possible
parameters ℓ, t, m, n, and number of rank errors.
2) Extend the concept of universal strong security from [24,
Definition 6] to general Fq-linear coset coding schemes, and
provide optimal universal strong secure schemes as those in
[24, Section V] for all possible parameters ℓ, t, m and n, for
either noiseless or noisy networks.
3) Subsection V-C implies that ℓ is close to but smaller than
n− t− e, where e is the number of list-decodable rank errors
with polynomial list sizes L. We conjecture, but leave as open
problem, that a bound similar to ℓ ≤ n−t−e holds in general.
4) Study the sharpness of the bounds given in Theorem 6.
APPENDIX A
DUALITY THEORY
In this appendix, we collect technical results concerning
trace duality of linear codes in Fm×n used throughout the
paper. Some of the results are taken or expanded from the
literature, and some are new. Recall first the definition of trace
product and dual of a linear code in Fm×n (Definition 15).
First, since the trace product in Fm×n coincides with the
usual inner product in Fmn, it holds that
dim(C⊥) = mn− dim(C), C ⊆ D ⇐⇒ D⊥ ⊆ C⊥,
C⊥⊥ = C, (C +D)⊥ = C⊥ ∩D⊥, (C ∩D)⊥ = C⊥+D⊥,
for linear codes C,D ⊆ Fm×n. We have the following:
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Lemma 63 ([35, Lemma 27]). If V ∈ RS(Fm×n), then V⊥ ∈
RS(Fm×n). More concretely, for any subspace L ⊆ Fn, it
holds that
(VL)
⊥ = V(L⊥).
Lemma 64 (Forney’s duality [16]). Given vector spaces
C,V ⊆ Fm×n, it holds that
dim(V)− dim((C⊥) ∩ V) = dim(C)− dim(C ∩ (V⊥)).
We now show that all GMWs of a linear code determine
uniquely those of the corresponding dual code. Since GMWs
and DGWs [34] coincide when F = Fq and m 6= n by
Theorem 9, the next result coincides with [34, Corollary 38]
in such cases:
Proposition 65. Given a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n with k =
dim(C), and given an integer p ∈ Z, define
Wp(C) ={dM,p+rm(C) | r ∈ Z, 1 ≤ p+ rm ≤ k},
W p(C) ={n+ 1− dM,p+rm(C) | r ∈ Z, 1 ≤ p+ rm ≤ k}.
Then it holds that
{1, 2, . . . , n} = Wp(C
⊥) ∪W p+k(C),
where the union is disjoint.
The proof of this proposition can be translated word by word
from the proof of [34, Corollary 38] using the monotonicity
properties from Proposition 43. However, [34, Corollary 38]
relies on [34, Theorem 37], and therefore we need to extend
such result to the cases F 6= Fq or m = n. The following
lemma constitutes such extension:
Lemma 66. Given a linear code C ⊆ Fm×n with k = dim(C),
and given 1 ≤ r ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ mn− k, it holds that
dM,s(C
⊥) 6= n+ 1− dM,r(C)
if r = p + k + r′m and s = p + s′m, for some integers
p, r′, s′ ∈ Z.
Proof. Assume that equality holds for a pair of such r and
s. Denote CL = C ∩ VL, for a linear subspace L ⊆ Fn, and
rewrite Proposition 14 as follows:
dM,r(C) = min{µ | max{dim(CL) | L ⊆ Fn,
dim(L) = µ} ≥ r}.
(17)
Write dM,r(C) = µ. Then Equation (17) implies that
max{dim(CL) | L ⊆ Fn, dim(L) = µ} ≥ r, (18)
and µ is the minimum integer with such property. Now write
dM,s(C⊥) = ν = n+ 1 − µ. In the same way, Equation (17)
implies that
max{dim((C⊥)L) | L ⊆ Fn, dim(L) = ν} ≥ s.
On the other hand, given a subspace L ⊆ Fn with dim(L) =
ν, we have that
dim(CL⊥) = dim(C ∩ (VL)
⊥) = k −mν + dim((C⊥)L),
where the first equality follows from Lemma 63, and the
second equality follows from Lemma 64 and Equation (2).
Therefore, it holds that
max{dim(CL) | L ⊆ Fn, dim(L) = µ− 1}
≥ k −mν + s = k −mn−m+mµ+ s.
(19)
From the fact that µ is the minimum integer satisfying Equa-
tion (18), and from Equation (19), we conclude that
k −mn−m+mµ+ s < r.
Now if we interchange the roles of C and C⊥, and the roles
of r and s, then we automatically interchange the roles of µ
and n+1−µ, and the roles of k and mn− k. Therefore, we
may also conclude that
k −mn+mµ+ s > r.
Using the expressions r = p+ k+ r′m and s = p+ s′m, and
dividing everything by m, the previous two inequalities are,
respectively
s′ − n− 1 + µ < r′, and s′ − n+ µ > r′,
which contradict each other. Hence the lemma follows.
Observe that the duality theorem for GRWs [12] is a direct
consequence of Theorem 7 and Proposition 65:
Corollary 67 ([12]). Given an Fqm-linear code C ⊆ Fnqm
of dimension k over Fqm , denote dr = dR,r(C) and d⊥s =
dR,s(C⊥), for 1 ≤ r ≤ k and 1 ≤ s ≤ n− k. Then
{1, 2, . . . , n} = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}
∪{n+ 1− d⊥1 , n+ 1− d
⊥
2 , . . . , n+ 1− d
⊥
n−k},
where the union is disjoint.
Finally, we show that the duality theorem for GHWs [42]
is a consequence of Theorem 8 and Proposition 65:
Corollary 68 ([42]). Given a linear code C ⊆ Fn of dimension
k, denote dr = dH,r(C) and d⊥s = dH,s(C
⊥), for 1 ≤ r ≤ k
and 1 ≤ s ≤ n− k. Then
{1, 2, . . . , n} = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}
∪{n+ 1− d⊥1 , n+ 1− d
⊥
2 , . . . , n+ 1− d
⊥
n−k},
where the union is disjoint.
Proof. We will use the notation in Proposition 65 during
the whole proof. First of all, by Theorem 8 it holds that
Wp(∆(C)) = {dH,p(C)} if 1 ≤ p mod n ≤ k and
Wp(∆(C)) = ∅ if k+1 ≤ p mod n ≤ n− 1 or p mod n = 0.
Therefore
n⋃
p=1
Wp−k(∆(C)) = {d1, d2, . . . , dk}.
On the other hand, from Proposition 65 it follows that(
n⋃
p=1
Wp−k(∆(C))
)
∪
(
n⋂
p=1
W p(∆(C)
⊥)
)
= {1, 2, . . . , n},
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where the union is disjoint. Hence we only need to show that
n + 1 − d⊥s ∈ W p(∆(C)
⊥), for p = 1, 2, . . . , n and s =
1, 2, . . . , n− k.
Denote by Dn ⊆ Fn×n the vector space of matrices with
zero components in their diagonals. It holds that ∆(C)⊥ =
∆(C⊥)⊕Dn.
Fix 1 ≤ s ≤ n−k and denote d = dH,s(C⊥). First, consider
a subspace D ⊆ C⊥ with wtH(D) = d and dim(D) = s, and
defineD′ ⊆ ∆(C)⊥ as the direct sum of∆(D) and all matrices
in Dn with columns in the Hamming support of D. Since
dim(D′) = d(n− 1)+ s and wtR(D′) = d, by Proposition 12
it follows that
dM,d(n−1)+s(∆(C)
⊥) ≤ d. (20)
On the other hand, assume that dM,(d−1)(n−1)+s(∆(C)
⊥) =
d′ < d. Let E ⊆ ∆(C)⊥ be such that wtR(E) = d′ and
dim(E) = (d− 1)(n− 1)+ s. Denote by ED the vector space
of matrices obtained by replacing the elements outside the
diagonal of those matrices in E by zero. If L = RSupp(E) ⊆
Fn, we claim that
dim(E ∩ Dn) ≤ nwtR(E)− wtH(L). (21)
It is sufficient to show that dim(VL ∩ Dn) = n dim(L) −
wtH(L). Denote by VLD the vector space of matrices obtained
by replacing the elements outside the diagonal of those ma-
trices in VL by zero. Then, by Proposition 9, dim(VLD) =
wtH(L), and dim(VL ∩ Dn) = dim(VL) − dim(VLD) =
n dim(L)− wtH(L).
By monotonicity (Proposition 43), we have that d′ = d −
1, and thus dim(E) = d′(n − 1) + s. Therefore, by (21),
dim(∆−1(ED)) = dim(ED) = dim(E) − dim(E ∩ Dn) ≥
s + wtH(L) − d
′. Choose indices i1, i2, . . . , iwtH(L)−d′ from
HSupp(∆−1(ED)), and define
W = {c ∈ ∆−1(ED) | cij = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ wtH(L)− d
′}.
Then W ⊆ C⊥, dim(W) ≥ s, and wtH(W) ≤
wtH(∆
−1(ED)) − wtH(L) + d′ ≤ d′, which implies
dH,s(C
⊥) = d′ < d, which is a contradiction. Hence
dM,(d−1)(n−1)+s(∆(C)
⊥) ≥ d. (22)
Combining Equation (20) and Equation (22), we conclude
that
dM,(d−1)(n−1)+s+j(∆(C)
⊥) = d,
for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, which implies that n + 1 − d⊥s ∈
W p(∆(C)⊥), for p = 1, 2, . . . , n, and we are done.
APPENDIX B
CONSTRUCTION OF EXPLICIT SUBSPACE DESIGNS
In this appendix, we recall how to construct the subspace
design formed by H0,H1,H2, . . . ⊆ Fqm in Section V. This
construction is given in [20], based on a construction in [19],
and is explicit in the sense that it can be constructed using an
algorithm of polynomial complexity on q.
Fix ε > 0 and a positive integer s such that 4sn ≤ εm,
and assume that n divides m. Let d1 = q
m/n−1, d2 =
qm/n−2, . . . , dm/n = 1 and let γ1, γ2, . . . , γm/n be distinct
non-zero elements of Fqn . Define
fi(x1, x2 . . . , xm/n) =
m/n∑
j=1
γijx
dj
j ,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , s, and let S ⊆ Fm/nqn be the set of common
zeros of f1, f2, . . . , fs, which is an Fq-linear vector space.
We may assume that S ⊆ Fqm by an Fqn -linear vector space
isomorphism Fm/nqn ∼= Fqm (any isomorphism works).
Let β be a primitive element of Fqn . For α ∈ Fqn⌊ εm2ns ⌋ , let
Sα =
{
αq
j
βi | 0 ≤ j <
⌊ εm
2ns
⌋
, 0 ≤ i < 2s
}
.
The algorithm in [19, Subsection 4.3] gives in polynomial time
over q a set F ⊆ F
qn⌊
εm
2ns
⌋ of size qΩ(
εm
ns
) such that:
1) Fq(α) = Fqn⌊ εm2ns ⌋ , for all α ∈ F ,
2) Sα ∩ Sβ = ∅, for all distinct α, β ∈ F , and
3) |Sα| = 2s⌊
εm
2ns⌋, for all α ∈ F .
Define the Fqn -linear vector space Vα ⊆ F
m/n
qn as
Vα = {(a0, a1, . . . , am/n−1) ∈ F
m/n
qn |
m/n−1∑
i=0
ai(αβ
j)i = 0 | 0 ≤ j < 2s},
for every α ∈ F , where we may consider Vα ⊆ Fqm as before.
Finally, the Fq-linear vector spaces H0,H1,H2, . . . ⊆ Fqm
in Section V are defined as Hi = S∩Vαi , for distinct αi ∈ F .
The constructions of F and Vα appeared first in [19,
Subsection 4.2] and S appeared first in [20, Corollary 6].
We conclude the appendix by computing the dimensions of
the vector spaces H0,H1,H2, . . . ⊆ Fqm , which is done in
the proof of [20, Theorem 8]:
Lemma 69 ([20]). The vector spaces H0,H1,H2, . . . ⊆ Fqm
have dimension at least m(1− 2ε) over Fq.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In this appendix, we give the proof of Theorem 4, which
we now recall:
Theorem 4. Let φ : V −→ W be a vector space isomor-
phism between rank support spaces V ∈ RS(Fm×n) and
W ∈ RS(Fm×n
′
), and consider the following properties:
(P 1) There exist full-rank matrices A ∈ Fm×m andB ∈ Fn×n
′
such that φ(C) = ACB, for all C ∈ V .
(P 2) A subspace U ⊆ V is a rank support space if, and only
if, φ(U) is a rank support space.
(P 3) For all subspaces D ⊆ V , it holds that wtR(φ(D)) =
wtR(D).
(P 4) φ is a rank isometry.
Then the following implications hold:
(P 1)⇐⇒ (P 2)⇐⇒ (P 3) =⇒ (P 4).
In particular, a security equivalence is a rank isometry and,
in the case V = W = Fm×n and m 6= n, the reversed
implication holds by Proposition 32.
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Proof. First we prove (P 1) =⇒ (P 2): It follows immediately
from the characterization of rank support spaces in Proposition
9, item 3.
Now we prove (P 2) =⇒ (P 3): Let L = RSupp(D) ⊆ Fn
and L′ = RSupp(φ(D)) ⊆ Fn
′
. It holds that VL ⊆ V and
VL′ ⊆ W , and they are the smallest rank support spaces in
V and W containing D and φ(D), respectively, by Lemma
8. Since φ preserves rank support spaces and their inclusions,
we conclude that φ(VL) = VL′ , which implies that dim(L) =
dim(L′) by (2), and (P 3) follows.
Next we prove (P 2) ⇐= (P 3): Assume that U ⊆ V is a
rank support space. This means that mwtR(U) = dim(U) by
(2). Since φ satisfies (P 3) and is a vector space isomorphism,
we conclude that mwtR(φ(U)) = dim(φ(U)), and thus φ(U)
is a rank support space also by (2). Similarly we may prove
that, if φ(U) is a rank support space, then U is a rank support
space.
Now we prove (P 3) =⇒ (P 4): Trivial from the fact that
wtR(〈{C}〉) = Rk(C), for all C ∈ V .
Finally we prove (P 1) ⇐= (P 2): Denote dim(V) =
dim(W) = mk and consider bases of V and W as in
Proposition 9, item 2. By defining vector space isomorphisms
Fm×k −→ V and W −→ Fm×k, sending such bases to the
canonical basis of Fm×k, we see that we only need to prove
the result for the particular case V =W = Fm×n.
Denote by Ei,j ∈ Fm×n the matrices in the canonical basis,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, that is, Ei,j has 1 in its (i, j)-th
component, and zeroes in its other components.
Consider the rank support space Uj =
〈E1,j , E2,j , . . . , Em,j〉 ⊆ Fm×n, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Since φ(Uj)
is a rank support space, it has a basis Bi,j , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
as in Proposition 9, item 2, for a vector bj ∈ Fn. This means
that
φ(Ei,j) =
m∑
s=1
a
(j)
s,iBs,j ,
for some a
(j)
s,i ∈ F, for all s, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j =
1, 2, . . . , n. If we define the matrix A(j) ∈ Fm×m whose (s, i)-
th component is a
(j)
s,i , and B ∈ F
n×n whose j-th row is bj ,
then a simple calculation shows that
φ(Ei,j) = A
(j)Ei,jB,
and the matrices A(j) and B are invertible. If we prove that
there exist non-zero λj ∈ F with A(j) = λjA(1), for j =
2, 3, . . . , n, then we are done, since we can take the vectors
λjbj instead of bj , define A = A
(1), and then it holds that
φ(Ei,j) = AEi,jB,
for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, implying (P 1).
To this end, we first denote by a
(j)
i ∈ F
m the i-th column in
A(j) (written as a row vector). Observe that we have already
proven that φ preserves ranks. Hence Rk(φ(Ei,j+Ei,1)) = 1,
which means that Rk(A(j)Ei,j+A
(1)Ei,1) = 1, which implies
that there exist λi,j ∈ F with
a
(j)
i = λi,ja
(1)
i .
On the other hand, a matrix calculation shows that
φ
 m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ei,j
 = ( m∑
i=1
a
(1)
i ,
m∑
i=1
a
(2)
i , . . . ,
m∑
i=1
a
(n)
i
)
B
=
(
m∑
i=1
a
(1)
i ,
m∑
i=1
λi,2a
(1)
i , . . . ,
m∑
i=1
λi,na
(1)
i
)
B.
Since Rk(
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1 Ei,j) = 1 and the vectors a
(1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤
m, are linearly independent, we conclude that λi,j depends
only on j and not on i, and we are done.
APPENDIX D
MATRIX MODULES
Rank support spaces can also be seen as left submodules of
the left module Fm×n over the (non-commutative) ring Fm×m.
This has been used in Example 62. Since we think this result
is of interest by itself, we include the characterization in this
appendix.
Definition 70 (Matrix modules). We say that a set V ⊆ Fm×n
is a matrix module if
1) V +W ∈ V , for every V,W ∈ V , and
2) MV ∈ V , for every M ∈ Fm×m and every V ∈ V .
Proposition 71. A set V ⊆ Fm×n is a rank support space if,
and only if, it is a matrix module.
Proof. Assume that V is a rank support space. Using the
characterization in Proposition 9, item 3, it is trivial to see
that V is a matrix module.
Assume now that V is a matrix module. It holds that V is a
vector space. Let L = RSupp(V), and take v ∈ L. There exist
V1, V2, . . . , Vs ∈ V and vj ∈ Row(Vj), for j = 1, 2, . . . , s,
such that v =
∑s
j=1 vj .
For fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ s, it is well-known
that there exists Mi,j ∈ Fm×m such that Mi,jVj has vj as its
i-th row and the rest of its rows are zero vectors. Since V is
closed under sums of matrices, we conclude that VL ⊆ V and
therefore both are equal.
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